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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AFTER STATE
COURT DEFAULT: A DEFINITION OF
CAUSE AND PREJUDICE
MARIA L. MARCUS *
The social interest in the general security and the social interest in the
individual life continually come into conflict and in criminal law, as
everywhere else in law, the problem is one of. . balancing conflicting
interests and of securing as many as may be and as completely as may
be with the least sacrifice . . .**
INTRODUCTION
D URING the course of a state prosecution, the defendant poses a
constitutional objection to the admission of damaging evidence. His
challenge is rejected by the trial court, and resort to state appellate and
collateral remedies after conviction is unavailing. As a final measure, the
defendant petitions for a federal writ of habeas corpus.
The statute embodying the writ' makes two historic commitments.
The first is to provide a process for examining the constitutionality of a
prisoner's detention.2 This process inevitably draws into question the va-
lidity of the state judgment of conviction, empowering federal district
court judges to correct errors of constitutional dimension by their coun-
terparts on the state court bench. Hence, the second commitment in the
congressional habeas scheme: The application for a writ may not be en-
tertained unless the applicant has already exhausted state court reme-
dies,3 thereby giving the state the first opportunity to determine the
validity of challenges to convictions.
Consider how these statutory strictures change if the state prisoner in
our hypothetical had posed no objection at his trial to the admission of
allegedly tainted proof, but nevertheless now requests that the federal
court order his release because of this defect. If the state has a contem-
poraneous objection rule which bars later presentation and review of the
claim, there would be no further state remedies to pursue. Exhaustion is
dispensed with when such remedies are no longer available at the time
the habeas petition is filed, even if they could have been invoked at the
time of trial.4 This "even if' provides the framework for the central
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. 1954,
Oberlin College; J.D. 1957, Yale University. The author acknowledges with gratitude the
valuable research assistance of Andrea G. Schacht and Lawrence S. Siracusa.
** Pound, The Future of the Criminal Law, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1901).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
2. See infra notes 50, 86 and accompanying text.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982).
4. See infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
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question in this Article: the appropriate restrictions on federal judicial
consideration of a defaulted but unexhaustable issue.
The same Supreme Court ruling that prohibited district courts from
dismissing petitions for failure to utilize no-longer-available state proce-
dures also recognized that some limitation on the granting of relief under
such circumstances would be warranted. The approach taken in Fay v,
Noia5 was that the habeas applicant's motive for defaulting could "disen-
title" him to the writ: "We. . hold that the federal habeas judge may
in his discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-
passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has for-
feited his state court remedies." 6
That approach was revised in Wainwright v. Sykes,7 which opted in-
stead for a requirement that petitioner show "cause and prejudice":
cause for the forfeiture and actual prejudice flowing from the claimed
violation beyond the fact of conviction.' This effected a shift from recog-
nizing a limited discretion in a federal district court to deny relief if de-
fendant's waiver was knowing and actual, to permitting a limited
discretion to grant relief if defendant's explanation of his default and its
consequences is satisfactory. The shift was accompanied by an assurance
that precise definition of the operative terminology would be supplied in
later cases. 9
Two recent Supreme Court decisions have provided important insights
into the tensions this assurance has created. Strickland v. Washington,'0
in the analogous area of incompetent counsel claims," has introduced a
prejudice definition that is also pertinent to analysis of the Sykes preju-
dice prong. Reed v. Ross12 is novel in two critical respects: It presents a
united judicial front on the demise of the Noia "deliberate bypass" for-
mulation,"3 but aligns a majority of the Justices behind the position that
the "cause and prejudice" standard should not be further defined. 4
Part I of this Article commences with an overview of the core issues
and then examines the process by which the cause and prejudice require-
ment, with its doctrinal and policy underpinnings, evolved as to forfeit-
ures by counsel at trial. 5 After comparing Sykes defaults to Strickland
5. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
6. Id. at 438.
7. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
8. Id. at 84-85, 87.
9. Id. at 87, 91.
10. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 253-68.
12. 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984).
13. See id. at 2909, 2913 n.1.
14. See id. at 2909.
15. The appropriate standard for habeas consideration of a constitutional claim
which was not proffered on appeal is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Forfeitures Resulting from Assigned Coun-
sel's Refusal to Raise Issues On Appeal, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 850, 871-77 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Appellate Forfeitures], for discussion of such a standard.
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incompetent counsel cases, Part I concludes that a more precise defini-
tion of cause and prejudice is essential to promote uniformity of federal
rights.
Part II of the Article offers a definition which could yield consistent
results. It explores the meaning of prejudice and its relation to guilt and
innocence and harmless error, the meaning of cause and its relation to
inadvertent forfeitures, and the connection of both prongs of the test to
miscarriage of justice.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE CAUSE AND PREJUDICE REQUIREMENT
The Wainwright v. Sykes 6 test has now been accepted in principle by
all nine Supreme Court Justices. Indeed, Justice Brennan, who fashioned
the deliberate by-pass standard of Fay v. Noia,"7 also wrote the majority
opinion in Reed v. Ross, 8 thus finally adopting cause and prejudice as the
appropriate formulation for determining the availability of federal habeas
corpus after state court default. This accord is fragile and has been
achieved in part because the question of whether inadvertence constitutes
cause for forfeiture of a constitutional claim remains unresolved.
A. Overview: Supreme Court Revision of Fay v. Noia
Sykes presented the cause and prejudice requirement as a response to
the "broad brush" approach used in Fay v. Noia to determine which de-
faulted claims may be heard by a federal district court. 9 Comparison of
Noia's basic assumptions to the recent pronouncements on the same
points in Reed v. Ross, a Sykes descendant, provides an overview of the
similarities as well as the dramatic doctrinal shifts which have developed.
Noia's state court conviction for felony murder rested upon a confes-
sion which the state later conceded to be coerced.20 He allowed the time
for a direct appeal to elapse, but then requested federal habeas corpus
review.2' The Supreme Court granted the writ,' concluding that Noia's
forfeiture of state remedies did not validate the unconstitutional conduct
by which the conviction was obtained.23 Because no relief was available
16. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
17. 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
18. 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984).
19. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88 n.12.
20. Nola, 372 U.S. at 394-96. Noia and two co-defendants were convicted of felony
murder in the shooting death of a robbery victim. The sole evidence against all three men
consisted of signed confessions later shown to be coerced. Both co-defendants sought
habeas corpus relief and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set aside their con-
fessions on the grounds that their statements had been unconstitutionally obtained. Re-
trial was impossible because no inculpatory evidence against them existed other than the
coerced confessions. New evidence could not be obtained; there was a fourteen year lapse
between petitioners' original convictions and the granting of the writ. See id. at 395 &
n. 1.
21. Id. at 394.
22. See id. at 398-99.
23. See id. at 428.
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within the state judicial system, "the federal courts have the power and
the duty to provide it." 2
4
Note that the majority empowered the federal courts to issue the writ
regardless of what has occurred in prior state court proceedings. 25 The
dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan urged that if a habeas petitioner has
violated a reasonable state rule and is therefore barred from state judicial
review, the federal courts have neither statutory nor constitutional au-
thority to release him from detention. 26 The dissent reasoned that such a
defendant's conviction would rest on an adequate and independent state
ground that the federal courts must respect.27 Subsequent Supreme
Court decisions could have wholly foreclosed federal relief after a state
court default simply by utilizing Justice Harlan's rationale.
His view, however, was never adopted, and the authority of the federal
judiciary to grant the writ despite a prior trial or appellate default has
been repeatedly reaffirmed.28 In part, this reaffirmation reflects a policy
determination that the habeas court must retain the capacity to act in the
event of a "miscarriage of justice."29 If petitioner has a colorable claim
of innocence, the court should be free to grant relief.
On this point, Fay v. Noia remains intact. In other respects the as-
sumptions underlying the Noia decision have been substantially revised.
The weight of the state's interest in the finality of a habeas applicant's
conviction has been recalculated, and the federal court's discretion to
grant a writ on a defaulted claim has been correspondingly diminished.
While Noia had discounted "conventional notions of finality" as a ba-
24. Id. at 441.
25. See id. at 426-27.
26. See id. at 448, 466, 469 (Harlan, J., dissenting). No specific provision was cited to
buttress the conclusion that constitutional authority does not exist. Justice Harlan
merely referred to the language of Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401
(1893):
[T]he Constitution . . . recognizes and preserves the autonomy . . . of the
States . . . . Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the
States is in no case permissible except as to matters . . . specially authorized
[by the Constitution].
Noia, 372 U.S. at 466 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This of course begs the question of
whether habeas relief may be said to fit into the exception described. The writ originates
in the Constitution, but limits on its availability have been approved despite that origin.
See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
27. See Noia, 372 U.S. at 448 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The relation of adequate and
independent state grounds to a defaulted claim is discussed in detail infra notes 70-109
and accompanying text.
28. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2907 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
91 (1977). The Reed majority held: "Our decisions have uniformly acknowledged that
federal courts are empowered. . . to look beyond a state procedural forfeiture and enter-
tain a state prisoner's contention that his constitutional rights have been violated. ...
The more difficult question . . . is: What standards should govern the exercise of tile
habeas court's equitable discretion in the use of this power?" 104 S. Ct. at 2907 (citations
omitted).
29. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
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sis for denying plenary federal review,3" Justice Brennan's Reed opinion
came to a strikingly different conclusion. He cited the federal interest in
providing a forum for constitutional challenges by prisoners, but de-
scribed finality as a significant competing concern that would be "under-
mined" if federal courts could ignore prior procedural defaults:31
To the extent that federal courts exercise their § 2254 power to review
... claims that were not properly raised before the state court, ...
legitimate state interests may be frustrated: evidence may no longer be
available to evaluate the . . . claim . . .; and it may be too late to
retry the defendant effectively if he prevails in his collateral
challenge.
32
With respect to the state's ability to handle constitutional questions, he
pressed further: "Each State's complement of procedural rules facilitates
[determination of constitutional challenges at a stage when] they can be
resolved most fairly and efficiently." 33
A more equivocal aspect of the revision concerned the treatment of
inadvertent forfeitures. Under a standard that prohibits only purposeful
evasion of state rules, habeas consideration would be granted if a failure
to present a claim was the result of carelessness. Noia held that a viola-
tion of state procedure flowing from "inadvertence or neglect" does not
bar habeas relief because the state interest implicated must yield to the
federal policy underlying the writ.34
Reed retreated from that position, holding that cause may be demon-
strated "under certain circumstances" when a default does not stem from
an intentional decision by counsel on behalf of his client.35 This, of
course, resembles the old Noia rule, but the Court's statement appears to
contain a converse implication that some inadvertent failures do not con-
stitute cause. 36 Dissenting Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun and O'Connor
objected to the ambivalence of this holding, but added that the thrust of
the majority's opinion makes clear that there will be no return to the
30. Noia, 372 U.S. at 424.
31. Reed, 104 S. Ct. at 2907.
32. Id. The Court would diminish the significance of the finality interest where the
habeas claims were "so novel when the cases were in state court that no one would have
recognized them." See id. at 2910. See infra notes 359-67, 370-74 and accompanying
text.
33. Reed, 104 S. Ct. at 2907. How often is appellate challenge to a conviction success-
ful? In 1983, the number of convicted defendants who filed applications for leave to
appeal in New York State's highest tribunal, the Court of Appeals, totaled 1,954. One
hundred of these applications were granted. Court of Appeals of the State of New York,
Ann. Rep. 13 app. (1983). Of those granted, 62.5% were affirmed, 31.2% were reversed,
4.2% were modified and 2.1% dismissed. Id at 6C app. Thirty-three cases came up to
the Court of Appeals pursuant to leave granted by New York's intermediate court, the
Appellate Division. Within this group, 72.7% of the convictions were affirmed, 15.2%
were reversed, 6.1% were modified and 6.1% were dismissed. Id.
34. 372 U.S. at 433.
35. 104 S. Ct. at 2909.
36. See infra Pts. I.B.3.c., 4.a. for a detailed discussion of the Court's analysis of
inadvertent default in Sykes and its successor Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
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deliberate bypass approach of Noia.3
Thus, the full impact of the cause and prejudice test can be assessed
only by exploring in depth the process by which the Noia standard was
revised, the purposes of the revision, and the court's explication of its
substitute requirement. Also essential is an inquiry into whether the
lower courts have received sufficient guidance to interpret this require-
ment, and the extent to which more content must be infused into the
terminology that has been chosen.
B. Wainwright v. Sykes Antecedents, Rationales, Purposes
and Progeny
1. Sykes and Its Predecessors
The majority opinion in Wainwright v. Sykes characterized its mission
as one of clarifying and limiting rather than overruling Fay v. Noia.3 s
Indeed, the Court declared that it was only expanding the scope of a
restriction which had already been established in a prior case.39 Analysis
of the cause and prejudice test therefore requires an examination not only
of Sykes but also of its ancestors.
The habeas corpus petition presented by John Sykes recited facts that
were considerably less sympathethic than those of Noia.40 Although his
claim was based on Miranda v. Arizona,41 Sykes conceded that police
officers had advised him of his rights. These rights were read to him at
the police station after his arrest; he declined counsel and made a state-
ment which was then reduced to written form. He refused to sign this
statement, but it was admitted into evidence through the testimony of the
two officers who had heard it.42 After a Florida jury trial, he was con-
victed of third degree murder.43
Sykes had been drinking on the day the killing occurred, and on the
previous day.' However, he did not at any time during the trial or in
37. Reed, 104 S. Ct. at 2913 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. "It is the sweeping language of Fay v. Noia, going far beyond the facts of the case
eliciting it, which we today reject." Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87-88.
39. "To the extent that the dicta of Fay v. Noia may be thought to have laid down an
all-inclusive rule . . . its effect was limited by [Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536
(1976)]. . . ." Sykes, 433 U.S. at 85.
40. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 74-75. Sykes' trial testimony was that on the night of the
killing, he asked his wife to call the police because he had shot Willie Gilbert. Other
proof indicated that when the police came to respondent Sykes' trailer home, they found
the deceased's body lying near the front porch. Respondent approached them and volun-
tarily stated that he had shot Gilbert; his wife confirmed this fact. Id. at 74.
41. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
42. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 74. Justice Stevens' concurrence points out that the main dif-
ference between this statement and other unchallenged evidence was that Sykes described
Gilbert as walking away from him at the time of the shooting rather than turning toward
him with a knife in a threatening manner. Id. at 96 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 74.
44. Id. at 74-75.
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subsequent state appeals contend that his statements were inadmissible
because he had been too intoxicated to understand the Miranda warn-
ings.45 This claim, later embodied in a habeas corpus petition based on
28 U.S.C. § 2254,4 was favorably received by the lower federal courts.
Holding that only strategy decisions at trial can bar federal habeas re-
view of constitutional error, the district court ordered a hearing on
whether Sykes had knowingly waived his Miranda rights.4 The order
was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.48
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the "simple legal question" at
issue was the construction of the habeas statute, which provides that the
writ shall be entertained on behalf of a state prisoner "'only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws...
of the United States.' ""4 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority
noted that although the language of the statute has remained relatively
unchanged, the Court has historically been willing to "overturn or mod-
45. This claim was made for the first time in a motion filed in the trial court after
appellate review, and was repeated again in state habeas corpus proceedings. Id. at 75.
The state courts refused to entertain the claim. Id. at 74.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982); see Sykes, 433 U.S. at 75. Any contention that counsel
was ineffective was relinquished. See id. at 75 n.4. See infra notes 263, 413-15 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the circumstances under which failure to make a timely
trial objection becomes a failure to render constitutionally adequate assistance.
47. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 76.
48. Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 528 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that under Florida law, it was the state's burden to obtain a
"prima facie determination of voluntariness." Id. at 525. The court also concluded on
the basis of Fay v. Noia that unless trial counsel had deliberately bypassed state proce-
dures as a trial tactic, habeas corpus relief could be granted despite Florida's contempora-
neous objection rule requiring prompt filing of motions to suppress illegally obtained
statements. Id. at 527. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), was found to be
inapposite. Sykes, 528 F.2d at 526-27. Davis had held that a federal prisoner's failure to
make a timely pre-trial motion to challenge the make-up of the grand jury that indicted
him would bar habeas review of his constitutional claim unless he could show cause for
the failure and prejudice flowing from such failure. Id. at 526 (citing Davis, 411 U.S. at
233). The court of appeals in Sykes noted that while no prejudice had been demonstrated
in Davis, prejudice is "inherent" in all cases where the admissibility of an incriminating
statement is at issue. Id. at 526-27.
49. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 77 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). To what extent does the
Constitution permit a discretionary refusal to entertain the writ when the applicant prof-
fers a constitutional challenge to his detention? Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 states that "[t]he privi-
lege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless. . . the public Safety
may require it." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has had occasion to sustain statutory
limitations on the granting of the writ. See, eg., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384
(1977). The Chief Justice concluded in Swain that the suspension clause was not
pertinent:
The sweep of the Suspension Clause must be measured by reference to the in-
tention of the Framers and their understanding of what the writ of habeas
corpus meant at the time the Constitution was drafted. . . . The writ in 1789
was not considered "a means by which one court. . . exercises post-conviction
review over the judgment of another. .. ."
Id at 384-85 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-
Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 451 (1966)).
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ify its earlier views of the scope of the writ."50
The majority proceeded with a sparse but fair summary of the Noia
holding.51 It then characterized that holding as having been circum-
scribed by later decisions in Davis v. United States,52 and Francis v.
Henderson .
An examination of Davis and Francis will indicate that their ancestral
50. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81. Justice Brennan's dissent in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107
(1982), a Sykes descendant, accuses the majority of embarking on "a conspicuous exercise
in judicial activism. . . . [i]n its eagerness to expatiate upon the 'significant costs' of the
Great Writ. . . and to apply 'the principles articulated in Wainwright v. Sykes.'" Id. at
137 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Isaac, 456 U.S. at 123, 126-28). To what extent
was Fay v. Noia itself an example of this willingness to reinterpret the prior parameters of
habeas discretion? Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Noia urged that custody resting
on an adequate and independent state ground could not violate federal law, and that the
federal courts therefore lacked not only the discretion but the power to issue the writ
under such circumstances. 372 U.S. at 448 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In a lengthy histori-
cal analysis Justice Harlan concluded that prior to 1915, federal habeas review examined
only the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal, id. at 450 (citing Ex parte Watkins, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830)), convictions under an allegedly unconstitutional statute, id.
at 451 (citing Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880)), and detention based on a claimed
illegality in the sentence imposed rather than in the judgment of conviction, id. (citing Ex
parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873)). The extension of the writ to state prisoners
in 1867 added a new class of persons to the ambit of the writ but did not alter its substan-
tive reach. The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies, introduced in 1886 and applica-
ble to state prisoners, authorized a discretionary postponement of review as to cases
which the federal courts had the power to decide. Id. at 453-54 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886)). From 1915 to 1953, beginning with tile
"mob domination" decision of Frank v. Mangum, the Supreme Court established that the
federal judiciary could consider whether habeas petitioners had been given an adequate
opportunity to raise their constitutional claims in the state courts. Id. at 456-57 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (citing Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915)). Brown v. Allen thereafter
expanded the scope of inquiry to include instances where petitioner could show that his
detention stemmed from a state court's allegedly erroneous determination of a constitu-
tional claim. However, there was no authority to review detention resting on a reason-
able application of the state's own procedural requirements. Id. at 460-62 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)).
The Noia majority's review of historical precedent stressed that although the writ is
procedural in form, it is inextricably related to the growth of personal rights of liberty.
See id. at 401. When the suspension clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, became part of
the Constitution and the first Judiciary Act was passed, giving federal judges habeas
corpus jurisdiction, there was "respectable common-law authority for the proposition
that habeas was available" in any case in which governmental detention violated funda-
mental law. Noia, 372 U.S. at 405. Justice Brennan acknowledged, however, that the
Supreme Court's development of a law of habeas corpus has not been "unwavering." Id.
at 411-12. Justice Harlan's chronology of the phases of that development was not directly
countered.
51. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 82-83 (citing Noia, 372 U.S. at 399). The Court's descrip-
tion of Noia emphasized the holding that petitioner was entitled to raise a habeas claim
even though he had failed to appeal his original conviction. See id. There was no deliber-
ate bypass of state court procedures because of the "grisly choice" between acceptance of
a life sentence and pursuit of an appeal which might culminate in a sentence of death. Id.
at 83. Noia had also found that on the basis of comity, a federal judge could deny the
writ to an applicant whose waiver of state remedies was "knowing and actual." Id.
52. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
53. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
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relationship to Sykes is somewhat speculative. Davis was a stepping
stone rather than a precedent, because it did not involve a state prisoner
and was based primarily on interpretation of congressional intent. In-
voking federal jurisdiction under section 2255,"4 petitioner claimed con-
stitutional error because of the racial composition of the federal grand
jury that indicted him.55 He had failed to comply with Rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which then provided56 that objec-
tions based on defects in the indictment must be raised in a pre-trial mo-
tion and that "waiver" under the rule could be cured only "for cause
shown."57 The Davis Court rejected the petitioner's contention that col-
lateral review could not be denied unless deliberate bypass and "knowing
waiver" standards were met.58 It held that Congress had not intended
that the cause requirement in Rule 12 be vulnerable to negation via
habeas corpus, and that some showing of actual prejudice resulting from
the alleged constitutional defect must be made.59
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982) provides that a federal prisoner is entitled to review when
he is held in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or when the court
that sentenced him lacked jurisdiction. If the judgment is found to be faulty, the court
will set aside the sentence and either discharge the action, resentence the prisoner or
grant a new trial. The writ will not be "entertained if it appears that the applicant has
failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court
has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention." Id.
55. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 238 (1973) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P.
12(b)(2)).
56. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539 n.4 (1976), notes that this provision now
appears at paragraphs (b)(2) and (f) of Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.
57. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 236 (1973). The term "waiver" implies the
knowing and voluntary relinquishment of a right, as described in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Invocation of this word is inappropriate when a defendant was not
advised of counsel's forfeiture of a claim, or when a default stemmed from "grisly alterna-
tives" or from inadvertence. See infra Pts. II.B.2., 3. This Article therefore uses the
more inclusive terms "forfeiture" and "default," which apply to any failure to present a
claim in a timely manner. For an extensive discussion of the differences between forfei-
ture and waiver, see generally Westen, Away from Maiver. A Rationale for the Forfeiture
of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1214 (1977).
58. Davis, 411 U.S. at 236. See supra note 57. Also rejected was the argument that
Davis should be governed by prior collateral review cases such as Kaufman Y. United
States, which had utilized the Noia standard. Davis, 411 U.S. at 240 (citing Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969)). Kaufman involved a failure to raise a claim on
appeal, and no federal rule expressly barred claims forfeited at the appellate level. Id.
Defaults at the trial level are distinguishable because defects can be cured before the
participants have undergone the expense and burden of a prosecution. Id. at 241. Justice
Rehnquist's Davis opinion held that the relevant precedent was Shotwell Mfg. Co. v.
United States, a direct review case establishing that Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure governed late challenges to a grand jury array. Davis, 411 U.S. at 238
(citing Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963)). In light of the Rule's
purpose, the standard on collateral review should not be more lenient than the one appli-
cable in the criminal proceeding itself. Id. at 240-41.
59. Davis, 411 U.S. at 242. The Court noted that the facts relevant to the jury selec-
tion process were available at the time of the indictment; that the petitioner, who was
black, was indicted together with two white accomplices; and that the government's case
was certainly strong enough to be sent to the grand jury. These factors were cited to
1985]
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The legislative intent foundation of Davis was replaced by a judicially
developed "comity" concept in Francis v. Henderson.60 The Francis
Court dispatched a Louisiana prisoner's challenge to a grand jury array
to which he had not objected on time.6 State law provided that unless
such objections were made in advance of trial, they were regarded as
waived.62 In a six page decision for the majority, Justice Stewart found
that the "important purposes ' 63 served by the Davis rule were equally
legitimate with respect to state criminal proceedings.' 4 Delay in deter-
mining grand jury discrimination questions means that witnesses or
grand jurors may be unavailable or dead, and that recollection of how a
particular grand jury was chosen may fade.65
Without further ado, Justice Stewart held that petitioner must meet
the Davis cause and actual prejudice requirements, because "considera-
tions of comity and federalism" 66 were as significant as considerations
affecting federal prosecutions: "[T]he National Government, anxious
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights. . .[should] do
so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of
the States.",67 This conclusion not only applied a federal Rule 12 forfei-
demonstrate lack of actual prejudice as well as lack of cause. See id. at 243-44. But see
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 552 n.3 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice
Brennan's later interpretation that the majority used prejudice merely as a "means of
demonstrating 'cause' for relief").
60. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
61. See id. at 537. The petitioner was a 17-year old black youth indicted for felony
murder. The death occurred during the robbery of a white couple by several black males,
during which one of the alleged robbers was killed. The death penalty was sought against
the three youths for the death of their accomplice. Appointed counsel, who had been out
of criminal law practice for several years, made no challenge to the composition of the
grand jury, although it was later alleged on collateral review that daily wage earners were
intentionally excluded and that therefore a disproportionate number of blacks were pre-
vented from serving. Id. at 554-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 537.
63. Id. at 540.
64. See id. at 540-41.
65. Id. at 541 (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 98 n.5 (1955)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 541-42. The Francis majority was quoting from Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 44 (1971), which rejected appellee's claim that the federal courts should enjoin
state authorities from prosecuting him under an allegedly invalid statute. Injunctive re-
lief against pending state criminal proceedings should not issue in the absence of ex-
traordinary circumstances such as bad faith harassment of defendant or enforcement of a
state statute which patently infringes the Constitution in every clause and sentence. See
Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54, which held:
[The] underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with
criminal prosecutions is reinforced by [the] vital consideration. . . of 'comity,'
that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a con-
tinuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways.
Id. at 44.
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ture to habeas for state prisoners, but also incorporated into the operable
test the language derived from the federal rules and their interpretation.
Justice Brennan, the lone dissenter in Francis, suspected that the
Court's purpose might be to dispense with Fay v. Noia's deliberate bypass
formulation, and challenged the majority to justify its new position:
If the Court believes that Fay is no longer good law, and if the Court
has the "institutional duty" to develop and explicate the law in a rea-
soned and consistent manner, then it has the duty to face squarely our
prior cases. . . and honestly state the reasons, if any, for its altered
perceptions of federal habeas jurisdiction. 68
2. Flaws in the Doctrinal Framework
To what extent was the challenge posed in Justice Brennan's Francis
dissent met by the Sykes opinion? The Sykes majority did not expressly
rely on comity and federalism, which Justice Brennan had dismissed as
"vague" concepts relevant to the postponement rather than the abdica-
tion of federal jurisdiction. 69 Rather, the majority attempted to give
sharper contours to its concern for federalism by invocation of the famil-
iar "adequate state grounds" doctrine.
This doctrine, which Sykes attenuated almost beyond recognition, tra-
ditionally comes into play when a decision of a state court rests on a
nonfederal basis which provides independent and adequate support for
the judgment. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court may not
review the state determination regardless of whether federal issues have
been raised.7 °
A substantive state foundation was the focus in early cases such as
Murdock v. Memphis.71 Murdock established that a decision resting on
68. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 547 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 551 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). See supra note 67. Yet
the Supreme Court has expressed persistent concern for the preservation of federalism.
Consider the federal-state comity issues implicit in the Court's reluctance to exercise eq-
uitable powers when interference with threatened state criminal proceedings would re-
suit. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), held that no person is immune
from a good faith prosecution for alleged criminal acts unless irreparable injury, clear and
immediate, is shown. Id. at 162-64. The state courts are the final arbiters of the meaning
and application of state criminal statutes, "subject only to review by this Court on federal
grounds appropriately asserted." Id. at 163; accord Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-
44 (1926).
70. See R. Robertson & F. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United
States § 89, at 163 (1951).
71. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). Murdock's ancestors had conveyed land to the city
of Memphis with a provision for reversion if the property was not appropriated for use as
a naval depot. The city conveyed the land without reservation to the United States,
which constructed the depot but then returned the property to the city. In claiming the
land, Murdock raised general trust law and a federal cession statute, but the state court
ruled against him on both grounds. Id. at 596-97. Murdock argued in the United States
Supreme Court that because Congress had repealed § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which had previously limited Supreme Court review of state court decisions to errors
directly concerning the question giving jurisdiction to review, every point passed on by
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adequate and independent nonfederal grounds could not be reversed even
if it contained errors concerning federal law, because a Supreme Court
opinion correcting these errors would have no effect on the judgment. It
would merely constitute impermissible advice to the state judiciary.72
Limited review of the sufficiency of any nonfederal issues would of course
be appropriate, indeed essential, because a spurious or untenable founda-
tion might otherwise defeat the federal claim.73
How does this rationale apply to procedural state grounds? The prem-
ise of Murdock was both acknowledged and shunted aside in Fay v. Noia.
While Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority recognized that the
Supreme Court on direct review cannot revise decisions based on ade-
quate state foundations regardless of whether federal issues are also pres-
ent, he concluded that Murdock was inapposite to collateral review.74
In the first place, Noia found, the jurisdictional prerequisite of habeas
is not the state court's judgment but the detention of the prisoner."
Murdock's concern with jurisdictional limits on revising state court deci-
sions therefore becomes irrelevant; the federal district court is not chang-
ing such decisions, "it [is] act[ing] only on the body of the petitioner. 76
Second, the Court noted that "the problem is crucially different from
that posed in Murdock.'' 77 While in Murdock substantive state policies
were at stake, "[i]n Noia's case the only relevant substantive law is fed-
the state tribunal could now be reconsidered. Id. at 616. The Court did not reach the
issue of whether this complete inquiry would be constitutional; it ruled only that the
statute as it then read did not authorize the inquiry. See id. at 635.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982), the provision now governing such Supreme Court re-
view, jurisdiction is limited to "judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a
State in which a decision could be had." The Noia majority found that this statutory
language supported continued adherence to Murdock because correction of state opinions
on state law questions would be merely advisory and therefore impermissible. See Noia,
372 U.S. at 430 n.40. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
72. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296
U.S. 207, 210 (1935); cf. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555 (1940) (consti-
tutional questions not reached unless necessary to decision); Ex parte Spencer, 228 U.S.
652, 664 (1913) (state questions are province of state courts).
Would the Murdock ban against advisory opinions operate to preclude habeas corpus
consideration of a state prisoner's defaulted claim? If the procedural rule violated by the
default is viewed as the reason for the prisoner's detention because he failed to avail
himself of the opportunity to be heard, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 484-85 (1953), the
habeas court should do no more than review the rule's sufficiency. See infra note 78.
Any consideration of the underlying constitutional claim would be advisory and enmesh
the reviewing court in deciding state law. However, if the constitutional violation is re-
garded as the reason for the detention, the issue is one of constitutional interpretation
appropriate for federal review. The answer to the initial question therefore depends en-
tirely on how the cause of the incarceration is described.
73. See Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 943, 967 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as Hill I]; Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground:
Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 187, 221, 227.
74. See Noia, 372 U.S. at 428-29.
75. See id. at 426.
76. Id. at 431.
77. Id.
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eral-the Fourteenth Amendment.""8 Noia's premise was that the con-
stitutional claim must be balanced against whatever procedural ground is
invoked by the state and that the former would almost invariably out-
weigh the latter. Thus the habeas court must pit the applicant's rights
against state interests such as the maintenance of orderly criminal
processes.79
The subsequent decision in Wainright v. Sykes resurrected the applica-
bility of the adequate state procedural ground doctrine to habeas corpus,
implicitly rejecting Noia's suggestion that granting the writ affects only
the prisoner's detention, not the state judiciary's judgment of convic-
tion. 0 However, rather than holding that the sufficiency of the state
foundation ended the quest, the Court retained Noia's use of a weighing
process to decide whether the writ should be granted."
The weighing process was expressed in Noia as a comparison between
the underlying constitutional claim and the importance of the state's in-
terest in the procedural rule violated. 2 In Sykes, the state's interest was
weighed against the significance of the habeas applicant's reasons for de-
faulting as well as the consequences of that default.8 3 Both formulations
distort the original meaning of the adequate state grounds doctrine.'
This doctrine only authorizes an inquiry into the sufficiency of the
78. Id. The majority did not acknowledge that the fourteenth amendment's due pro-
cess clause was satisfied to the extent that the state had preserved defendant's right to be
heard. Noia failed to avail himself of this aspect of his fourteenth amendment rights;
therefore he obtained no state ruling on the admission of the coerced confession. The
competence of his counsel was not challenged. Indeed, Noia had personally approved the
default. The Court's statement that "due process denied in the proceedings leading to
conviction is not restored just because the state court declines to adjudicate the claimed
denial," id, at 427, omits the reasons for the declination.
79. Justice Brenan in Noia defined these interests as including an "airtight system of
forfeitures," punishment of a defaulter and deterrence of others who might otherwise
commit defaults. See id. at 431-33. The overall question of state autonomy was consid-
ered relevant to Murdock, but discounted as to habeas corpus cases such as Noia. See id.
at 431. See infra notes 112-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state inter-
ests implicated when a defendant seeks to assert a defaulted claim.
80. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89-90. Because the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a
state judgment, an order directing his release invariably nullifies that judgment. In addi-
tion, such an order would undermine the state procedural requirement which petitioner
had violated. Granting the writ would not stigmatize the reasonableness of the state rule.
See Abraham D. Sofaer's analysis in Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners..
The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 78, 94 (1964) [hereinafter cited as The Isola-
tion Principle]. However, the effect of according habeas relief would be to nullify this rule
in all cases presenting constitutional claims unless a discretionary limitation on the dis-
trict court's jurisdiction is invoked.
81. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87.
82. See Noia, 372 U.S. at 431-32.
83. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91.
84. See supra text accompanying note 72. Nor can it be argued that decisions other
than Noia resorted to a balancing test for procedural cases that the Court was unwilling
to use in a substantive law context. See infra text accompanying note 106 for a discussion
of Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), an oft-cited procedural precedent where no
such weighing process was utilized.
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grounds-whether they are reasonable, supported by the record, and in
accord with previous state authority.85 It does not contemplate a balanc-
ing operation that would require not only deciding whether these founda-
tions are adequate but also whether they occupy as favored a position as
the concerns proffered by the defendant.
Furthermore, this distortion is not justified by the procedural context
in which it was presented. After reviewing the common law and statu-
tory history of the writ,86 Sykes described the adequacy of state proce-
dural foundations to bar federal habeas review as a crucial area.87 The
Court's analysis, however, was limited to naming "the pertinent deci-
sions marking the. . . somewhat tortuous efforts to deal with this prob-
lem,"88 and a brief description of Brown v. Allen. 9
The Brown decision both supports and undercuts the conclusions in
Sykes. There, petitioner's counsel had not mailed appeal papers on the
last day set by state law for filing. Although the papers were hand-deliv-
ered the following day, the state supreme court refused to accept them
because the time for appeal had expired.9" The United States Supreme
Court held that this ruling precluded federal habeas consideration of the
contentions which were never entertained by state appellate tribunals:
"[W]here the state action was based on an adequate state ground, no
further examination is required, unless no state remedy for the depriva-
85. See Sandalow, supra note 73, at 226, 227. The grounds asserted must also be
independent of the federal issue, see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1979), and
broad enough to maintain the judgment, Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 369-70 (1893).
86. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 77-85. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the writ's earliest
predecessor, which existed under the Judiciary Act of 1789, was available only for a
petitioner held in federal custody. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 77-78. Congress in 1867 ex-
tended the writ to those held in state custody. Id. at 78. Although the federal habeas
statute was originally construed as authorizing only an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court, id. at 78 (citing Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830)), this
approach was gradually changed, id. at 79 (citing Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163
(1873), and Exparte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855)), and then explicitly rejected,
id. at 79 (citing Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942)). Waley acknowledged that
habeas review is appropriate as to claims involving " 'disregard of the constitutional
rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his
rights.' "Id. at 79 (quoting Waley, 316 U.S. at 105). The circumstances under which the
federal court should hold a fact-finding hearing to review the state court's prior rulings
were examined in Townsend v. Sain and codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). See
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 80 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)).
Consideration of a habeas claim may be barred by the adequacy of the independent
procedural grounds asserted by the state in support of the detention, although such pro-
cedural grounds have been treated differently from those that are substantive. Id. at 82.
Brown v. Allen established that habeas is not available to review a constitutional claim
resting on an adequate and independent procedural basis where direct review of this
claim would have been barred in the Supreme Court. Id. (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 486-87 (1953)). See also supra note 50 for a discussion of the history of the writ.
87. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81-82.
88. Id. at 82.
89. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
90. Id. at 484-85.
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tion of federal constitutional rights ever existed.""1 Thus, procedural
grounds were relevant not only to direct but also to collateral review.9"
In addition, the Brown Court took the view that once the state proce-
dural foundation has been found to be sufficient, the door to the federal
courthouse is closed.93 Thus, no discretion would remain to pick and
choose among proffered petitions, whether pursuant to a deliberate by-
pass formulation or a cause and prejudice standard. Yet Sykes, like Noia,
adopted the opposite position that the habeas court could decide not only
whether the state ground was adequate, but whether the writ should
nonetheless be granted on the basis of a generally described discretion.94
Further development of a distinction between substantive and proce-
dural bases was provided in the post-Brown ruling in Henry v. Missis-
sippi.95 Henry involved violation of a contemporaneous objection rule as
to admission of illegally seized evidence, but not a complete default on
this fourth amendment claim. 96 Defendant had moved for a directed ver-
dict at the close of the state's case, citing the introduction of the tainted
proof.97 The state courts found that as a matter of state law, violation of
the contemporaneous objection requirement precluded consideration of
the constititutional challenge.98
When the case reached the Supreme Court on direct review, the major-
91. Id. at 458.
92. See id. at 486-87. See supra notes 54-59, infra notes 238, 242, 244 and accompa-
nying text with respect to federal procedural rules as a bar to the granting of collateral
relief to federal prisoners.
93. See 344 U.S. at 485. Since the opinion also explored other grounds for its hold-
ing, its precedential value is somewhat diminished. The Brown majority refers both to
waiver and exhaustion. "Failure to appeal .... bars subsequent objection to convic-
tion on those grounds." Id. at 486. "A failure to use a state's available remedy, in the
absence of some interference or incapacity ... bars federal habeas corpus." Id. at 487;
see also The Isolation Principle, supra note 80, at 82 n.24 (interrelation of devices that
limit habeas corpus review).
94. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91; Noia, 372 U.S. at 438. See supra text accompanying
notes 25-29 for a discussion of the undiluted federal power to grant the writ.
95. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
96. Id. at 445-46. Defendant was a black resident of Clarksdale, Mississippi, and an
official of the NAACP. He was charged with disturbing the peace by molesting a hitch-
hiker to whom he had allegedly given a ride in his car. The principal evidence against
defendant was the testimony of the alleged hitchhiker. The state sought to corroborate
this evidence by introducing a police officer's testimony about certain aspects of defend-
ant's car interior. The officer reported on details which had also been mentioned by the
complaining witness. The officer's search of the car was unlawful, but no objection to his
testimony was offered until the close of the state's case. Id. at 444-45.
97. Id. at 445.
98. See id. at 446. The Supreme Court of Mississippi had at first reversed the convic-
tion because the search was unlawful. The state's requirement of a contemporaneous
objection to the tainted evidence was not applied because fundamental rights were in-
volved and because Henry had been represented by nonresident counsel who were una-
ware of state procedure. The court withdrew its first opinion when the state argued in a
"Suggestion of Error" that defendant had local counsel as well. This left the conviction
in place. See Henry v. State, 253 Miss. 263, 281-82, 154 So. 2d 289, 296 (1963), vacated,
379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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ity opinion held that when solely procedural grounds support a state
court decision, the state's rule must serve a "legitimate" interest.99 The
existence of such an interest was acknowledged: Prompt objection gives
the trial court an opportunity to exclude the fruits of the illegal search
and avoid reversal and a new trial."°°
Yet the Court suggested that Henry had been prompt enough. The
application of the rule under these circumstances was not legitimate, be-
cause the motion for a directed verdict served the same alerting function
as a contemporaneous objection, permitting the trial judge to avoid error
and waste of judicial resources.'O° Moreover, even if the state foundation
were deemed to preclude Supreme Court review, a federal district court
could consider the constitutional claim in a habeas proceeding unless the
forfeiture of state remedies constituted a Noia deliberate bypass.,0 2
Henry's distinction between the relative adequacy of substantive and
procedural grounds is ultimately unpersuasive. The assertion of a sub-
stantive ground may follow a state disposition of the federal claim, while
the assertion of a procedural ground may follow the defendant's failure
to submit the federal claim to the state courts for disposition. Neverthe-
less, both foundations could block the implementation of a federal
right. 103 Both may arguably frustrate federal policy. However, a legiti-
mate procedural ground may pose less conflict with the supremacy
clause," since it does not create a policy competing with federal law, but
only regulates the way in which federal claims are to be proffered in state
courts. 105 And it cannot be assumed that the state considers most of its
substantive policies to be more important than the accuracy and effi-
ciency of its criminal law administration.
Even accepting the substance/procedure dichotomy as valid, Henry
does not fundamentally alter the adequate state ground rationale. The
methodology used in Henry departed from the traditional scrutiny of the
99. See Henry, 379 U.S. at 449.
100. Id. at 448.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 452. Commentators both before and after Henry have found this distinction
dubious, arguing that the considerations for application of the adequate state ground
doctrine are the same on habeas as on direct review. See Hart, The Supreme Court: 1958
Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 118-19 (1959);
Sandalow, supra note 73, at 231-34. Professor Sandalow concludes:
If the state's interest in requiring adherence to its procedures is insufficient to
bar habeas corpus, it is difficult to see why it is sufficient to bar direct review
... . [T]he practical effect of ignoring the state procedural determination
would be the same in both situations: to put extreme pressure on the state
courts to ignore their procedural rules in deference to the federal claim.
Id. at 232-33. But see Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Pro-
ceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1347 (1961) ("a federal habeas corpus proceeding differs
from direct review both in the quality and the extent of interference with the state's
domain").
103. See Salidalow, supra note 73, at 198.
104. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
105. See Sandalow, supra note 73, at 228-29.
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sufficiency of state foundations to the extent that it looked to the particu-
lar application of a valid procedure to see whether the defendant's de-
fault had in fact adversely affected the state's interest. Yet once a
legitimate interest has been infringed, a state judgment based upon it may
not be disturbed by the reviewing court.10 6
By contrast, the version of adequate state ground adopted in Sykes
effects a fundamental doctrinal change. The legitimacy of the state's in-
terest is only the first tier of the scrutiny; the second, as we have seen,"0 7
weighs that interest against defendant's cause and prejudice showing.
The majority's purpose in adopting this approach can be readily dis-
cerned. In the context of a default by counsel, the Court did not wish to
approve a standard that confines the habeas inquiry to determining
whether the state foundation is reasonable, independent of the federal
issues, broad enough to maintain the judgment, fairly supported by the
record, and consonant with prior state precedents."0 8 Such a standard
would have precluded the granting of the writ in all cases where the op-
portunity to comply with legitimate state procedures had been made
available. A closed-door system would have none of the flexibility sug-
gested by the definition proposed in Part II of this Article.
Nonetheless, it must be recognized that the adequate state ground doc-
trine has lost its original identity in its Sykes incarnation. As it is formu-
lated, it is indistinguishable from the comity concerns described in
Francis v. Henderson.'" It merely expresses a general policy of deference
to state interests, without supplying any criteria for assessing the degree
of deference or the circumstances under which cause and prejudice
should be found.
3. Sykes and Its Purposes
Despite the Sykes majority's characterization of its goal as one of
pruning rather than discarding Fay v. Noia, 10 dissatisfaction with Noia's
premises emerged. In revising these premises, the Court had three pur-
poses: enhancing state interests, reinterpreting counsel's power to effectu-
ate a binding default without the client's assent, and diminishing the
distinction between deliberate and inadvertent attorney conduct. After
106. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
109. 425 U.S. 536 (1976). See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. Cf Seidman, Factual Guilt and
the Burger Cour" An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80
Colum. L. Rev. 436, 465 (1980) ("[It is not] entirely clear that, as a practical matter, the
new cause and prejudice standard really marks a sharp departure from the deliberate
bypass test. Of course, the Wainwright Court tells us that the two standards are different.
But the Court's extraordinary reluctance to give any content to the new test leaves in
doubt the real significance of the difference.") (footnote omitted). But see Rosenberg,
Jettisoning Fay v. Noia" Procedural Defaults by Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62
Minn. L. Rev. 341, 447 (1978) (concluding that Nola has been entirely replaced).
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elimination of several plausible but ultimately unsatisfactory interpreta-
tions of Sykes, it becomes evident that the third purpose is the most sig-
nificant, even though the majority avoided any express ruling on
inadvertence. 11'
a. Enhancing State Interests
Much of Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Sykes majority was ad-
dressed to identifying the state's procedural interests and upgrading the
advantages of enforcing them. The overarching theme was the respect
which should be accorded to state functions. Because the term "comity"
was never explicitly invoked, there was no need to explain its precise
application in this context.' 2 Rather, the Court introduced its theme
with a specific linkage to congressional intent as expressed in the habeas
corpus statute: "[T]he 1966 amendment to § 2254 requires deference to
be given to . . . determinations made by state courts[;] the determina-
tions themselves are less apt to be made in the first instance if there is no
contemporaneous objection to the admission of the evidence on federal
constitutional grounds."' 1
3
Although commentators have suggested that the intrusion into state
judicial processes may be greater when a federal court reviews a claim
which several tiers of state judges have rejected," 14 the Court has solid
111. Justice Rehnquist's hesitance is understandable, as two of the concurring Justices
indicate that inadvertence should always constitute cause. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 96-97
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 98-99 (White, J., concurring). See infra notes 183-84 and
accompanying text.
112. Comity is relevant in the general sense: The Supreme Court has emphasized that
the federal judiciary must avoid unnecessary intrusion into legitimate state activities.
However, past precedent has centered on refusal to enjoin pending or threatened state
prosecutions, rather than on refusal to issue a writ which would in effect invalidate a state
conviction. See supra notes 67, 69 and accompanying text. The Sykes Court did not avail
itself of the opportunity to create a precedent as to the role of comity in the habeas
context.
113. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88. The state trial judge could of course raise the constitutional
problem sua sponte. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that "as the proceeding unfolded,"
the judge presiding over John Sykes' trial could not be criticized for failing to do so. See
id. at 91. This may imply that under some circumstances, habeas review might be
granted if such judicial prompting did not occur. Commentators have suggested that
states could decrease the number of procedural defaults by advising judges of new consti-
tutional rulings and asking them to remind counsel of potential constitutional claims.
Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Unintentionally Defaulted Constitutional Clains,
130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 981, 1001 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Defaulted Constitutional
Claims]; see Rosenberg, supra note 110, at 413; Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural
Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 514 (1978); Tague, The Attempt to
Improve Criminal Defense Representation, 15 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 109, 142 & nn.175-78,
161-62 & n.282 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Tague I]. Professor Tague suggests methods
for judicial supervision of counsel and also discusses the problems such supervision en-
tails. See id. at 161-65.
114. See Comment, "Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice" The Supreme Court's Ver-
sion of the "Truly Needy" in Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 20 San Diego L.
Rev. 371, 395 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Proceedings]; see
also Hart, supra note 102, at 118 (deference to state court procedural determinations not
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grounds for reaching the opposite conclusion that the intervention is
often more significant when a defaulted claim is decided. The congres-
sional requirement that state prisoners exhaust state remedies prior to
receiving federal habeas consideration was developed in deference to the
states' capacity and willingness to resolve constitutional challenges.' 5 If
such a resolution has occurred and the state record shows that the habeas
applicant received a full and fair trial, a plenary federal hearing is gener-
ally deemed unnecessary.1 16 Thus, the intrusion is made semi-palatable.
By contrast, federal disposition of a constitutional claim which the state
courts had no opportunity to adjudicate imposes a de novo determination
and is therefore more intrusive.
The Sykes majority elaborated on several reasons for its deference to
the states: improved fact-finding, finality, reduction of wasted court
time, and prevention of manipulation by criminal defendants or their
counsel.1 17 On the question of better fact-finding, the Court came to the
unexceptionable conclusion that prompt objection at trial allows correc-
tion at a time when witnesses still remember the events and their de-
meanor is under observation by the judge who decides the constitutional
claim." 8 It is interesting to note that little emphasis was placed on the
one point which the dissent acknowledged as critical: Default followed
by issuance of the writ years later may mean that effective fact-finding is
inconsistent with reexamination of federal claims); Reitz, supra note 102, at 1349
(although state court judgment rests on adequate and independent state ground, Congress
may "provide a federal forum for the vindication of federal rights").
115. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982) (exhaustion re-
quirement). See generally 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & . Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4264 (exhaustion of state remedies). The rationale for the judicially created
exhaustion rule that preceded the congressional enactment is explored in Exparte Royall,
117 U.S. 241 (1886).
116. See, e.g., Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S 539, 546 (1981); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293, 312-13 (1963); see also Note, State Criminal Procedure and Federal Habeas Corpus,
80 Harv. L. Rev. 422, 425 (1966) (federal court must also examine adequacy of state
procedures) [hereinafter cited as State Criminal Procedure]. Indeed, where a fourth
amendment claim is at issue, such a full and fair hearing precludes federal review alto-
gether. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976), discussed infra notes 313-21 and
accompanying text.
117. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-89. The Court did not directly invoke the argument that the
broad Noia standard created too great a workload for federal district courts. One com-
mentator has argued, however, that although the Sykes majority did not mention the
floodgates problem, this problem was an underlying reason for the decision. See Appellate
Forfeitures, supra note 15, at 863. 8059 federal habeas petitions were filed in 1982; this
amounted to a filing increase of approximately 700% since 1961. Id. at 852 n.5 (citing
Bureau of Statistics, United States Dep't of Justice, Habeas Corpus-Federal Review of
State Prisoner Petitions 2 (1984)). See also Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Proceedings,
supra note 114, at 394, suggesting that if attorneys pose more constitutional objections in
state courts, there will be more issues preserved in state appeals and more candidates for
federal habeas corpus. This suggestion overlooks the fact that such a workload would
consist of properly presented and exhausted claims. These claims are entitled to review,
and would be considered with the aid of a prior opinion by the state judiciary.
118. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88.
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precluded.1" 9 The witnesses may be forgetful, unavailable or dead, and
documents may be lost, preventing altogether the reprosecution of the
defendant. 120
Judicial economy, particularly with respect to finality of judgments,
occupied a central place in Justice Rehnquist's panoply. Objection could
lead to exclusion of the offending evidence, which in turn might induce
the jury to acquit, or at least to convict on untainted proof.1 2' Alterna-
tively, the constitutional objection might be rejected but would still
culminate in a full and fair hearing which could provide information and
guidance to the subsequent habeas court.122 All these possibilities pre-
serve the original criminal trial as the "main event," where the relevant
proof and the available resources are combined to decide the central is-
sue: guilty or not guilty.12
3
These invocations of state interests do not tell us how many pounds
should be allotted to them when they are placed on the scale against a
petitioner's twin claims of constitutional error and innocence. 24 A
weighing process is necessitated by the Sykes majority's interpretation of
the adequate state grounds doctrine, 125 but after each relevent compo-
nent is identified, this weighing process breaks down. In an effort to en-
hance the state's side of the scale, the majority launched its controversial
"sandbagging" theory, 2 6 which refocuses blame on the habeas applicant
by stressing the guilt of the calculating forfeiter. The opinion set out this
theory in one sentence:
We think that the rule of Fay v. Noia, broadly stated, may encourage
'sandbagging' on the part of defense lawyers, who may take their
chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial court with the intent
to raise their constitutional claims in a federal habeas court if their
initial gamble does not pay off.127
Two assumptions are latent in this statement. One is that the practice
described is not a rarity. The other is that a change of judicial direction
was needed to deter such attorneys because Noia's deliberate bypass stan-
dard does not provide an adequate warning signal.
119. Id. at 112 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. Justice O'Connor stressed this point in her opinion for the Court in Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982): "Passage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion
of witnesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible."
121. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-89.
122. Id. The majority also observed that objection could even induce the prosecutor to
withdraw the disputed proof and restructure the case rather than risk appellate or collat-
eral reversal. Id. at 89.
123. Id. at 90.
124. In a few cases, defendant disputes only the degree of the crime for which he was
convicted. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 156-58 (1982), where a petitioner
convicted of murder argued that although the evidence against him was "overwhelming,"
erroneous jury instructions on malice prevented a manslaughter verdict.
125. See supra Pt. I.B.2.
126. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89.
127. Id.
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Yet close analysis indicates that sandbagging and deliberate bypass are
curiously similar. Noia had held that "the exigencies of federalism war-
rant. . .[denial of federal relief] to one who has deliberately sought to
subvert or evade the orderly adjudication of his federal defenses in the
state courts"'128 because of "strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that
can fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state
procedures." 129
Justice Brennan, the author of Noia, made interchangeable use of the
sandbagging and bypass concepts in his lengthy Sykes dissent.' ° Ironi-
cally, however, his dissent argued that sandbagging is unlikely to oc-
cur.13' He noted that a lawyer could present a constitutional claim in the
state courts and hope to win there or on collateral review. As an
alternative,
[counsel] could elect to "sandbag.". .. [T]o carry out his scheme, he
would now be compelled. . . to convince the judge that he did not
"deliberately bypass" the state procedures. If he loses on this gamble,
all federal review would be barred, and his "sandbagging" would have
resulted in nothing but the forfeiture of all judicial review of his client's
claims.
132
The dissent concluded that no "rational" lawyer would engage in such
conduct. 133 Nevertheless, Noia had acknowledged that some attorneys
purposely default in state court and that it is necessary to devise a block-
ade against this tactic.' 34
The anomaly affects the Sykes majority and dissenting views, as both
appear to assume that deliberate bypass under a new rubric will have a
different consequence. Can the inconsistency be resolved by interpreting
sandbagging as a more inclusive concept than bypassing? The argument
would run that he who sandbags is "irrational" not in foregoing his state
court remedies, but in making such a choice for reasons which could
bring no benefit to his client.33 Noia, in punishing only reasonable de-
128. 372 U.S. at 433.
129. Id. at 439. The issue of whether a deliberate bypass requires in all cases that the
client assent to the circumvention is discussed infra at Pt. I.B.3.b.
130. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 102 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 103 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Noia, 372 U.S. at 433. See infra note 384 and accompanying text.
135. For an example of such an "irrational" default, see Gruttola v. Hammock, 639
F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1981), where the defense attorney failed to raise the claim that pretrial
publicity prejudiced the eyewitness identification of his client. See id. at 928. The de-
fendant was accused of robbery, and of shooting a police officer and a patron in a local
bar. Id at 924. The New York City newspapers and television stations ran extensive
stories on the incident, including pictures of the defendant. Id. Had counsel objected to
this prejudicial publicity, the testimony of the eyewitnesses could have been suppressed
and the "jury's verdict may well have been different." Id. at 930 & n.5. The court of
appeals found that the defense attorney must have been aware of the potential claim,
because he cross-examined the witnesses on the publicity issue. See id. at 930.
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fault strategy, did not go far enough and a new label was necessary to
cover ill-conceived tactics as well.
The language of the Sykes opinions does not support this interpreta-
tion of the sandbagging phenomenon. Justice Rehnquist's decision for
the Court made no distinction between types of strategy; the concurring
Justices differed from each other not only as to the kind of deliberate
choice which was interdicted in Noia, but also as to the kind which
should be penalized by the new approach." a6 Ultimately, this explana-
tion of the majority's sandbagging emphasis accounts neither for the
Court's dissatisfaction with the Noia formulation nor for the necessity of
establishing the cause and prejudice standard.
b. Reinterpreting Unilateral Attorney Default
Another possible interpretation of the Court's tacit conclusion that de-
liberate bypass and sandbagging diverge is that the former is addressed to
defaults in which the client also participated, while the latter involves
defaults allegedly occuring without the client's knowledge.'37 The Noia
majority had held that federal review could be forfeited only by a know-
ing waiver, "the considered choice of the petitioner" acting "after consul-
tation with competent counsel or otherwise."' 38 The assertion that
defendant was unaware of the decision to withhold a constitutional claim
136. Justice Stevens' concurrence concluded that the cause and prejudice requirement
is not a "significant departure" from Fay v. Noia, because "the holding is consistent with
the way other federal courts have actually been applying Fay." Sykes, 433 U.S. at 94
(Stevens, J., concurring). The opinion went on to explain that courts have "generally
found a 'deliberate bypass' where counsel could reasonably have decided not to object."
Id. at 95 n. I (emphasis added). Since Justice Stevens read both Noia and Sykes as cover-
ing only well-conceived strategy, no change would have been effectuated by prohibiting
sandbagging.
Justice White's concurring opinion embraced the old deliberate bypass approach rather
than the new cause formulation. See id. at 98 (White, J., concurring). However, unlike
Justice Stevens, he did not appear to limit Noia's application solely to reasonable default
decisions. Any default that "flows from [counsel's] exercise of professional judgment"
constitutes a deliberate bypass. Id. at 99. Under this view of Noia, reasons which could
benefit the client would apparently have the same effect as those which could not, because
"[i]t will not later suffice to allege in federal habeas corpus that counsel was mistaken,
unless . . . the error is sufficiently egregious to demonstrate . . . [incompetence contra-
vening the sixth amendment]." Id. Under Justice White's interpretation, no new re-
quirement would be needed to cover unreasonable but deliberate decisions, which were
already penalized under the old approach. Justice Burger's concurrence addresses only
the issue of unilateral action by counsel. See infra Pt. I.B.3.b.
137. This distinction has been suggested by Professor Larry Yackle, a thoughtful and
knowledgeable commentator on habeas corpus. See L. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies
§ 86, at 167 (1981).
138. Noia, 372 U.S. at 439. The "knowing waiver" formulation was developed in
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). However, not every deliberate choice would
fit the Zerbst rationale. Noia did make a personal decision not to appeal, but since he
faced the choice of accepting life imprisonment or pursuing an appeal which might have
resulted in retrial and a death sentence, his decision was not merely a tactical circumven-
tion of state rules. Noia, 372 U.S. at 440. Without such a deliberate evasion, the federal
court would lack discretion to deny relief. See id. at 433.
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could therefore place such a decision outside Noia's prohibition. The
sandbagging attorney would be encouraged 139 to make such an assertion
because of the availability of a federal writ if that prohibition were found
to be inapplicable."4
The majority and concurring opinions in Sykes authorized a penalty
for unilateral forfeiture. They took the view that counsel's failure to prof-
fer a constitutional claim at trial may preclude subsequent federal habeas
consideration even if the client did not know of this failure, 4 ' unless
cause and prejudice are demonstrated. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for
the majority made a footnote reference to the binding effect of a trial
attorney's decisions on defendant. 42 A practical note was sounded in
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion: "The notion that a client must al-
ways consent to a tactical decision not to assert a constitutional objection
to a proffer of evidence has always seemed unrealistic to me." ''  The
concurrence also suggested, however, that a default by counsel should
not be binding where the right involved is "'deeply embedded' in the
Constitution.""
This raises the issue of whether the consequences of counsel's default
should turn on which federal right is at stake.' 45 Chief Justice Burger's
139. The Sykes majority had stressed that the Noia approach could encourage
sandbagging, but offered no explanation for its conclusion. See 433 U.S. at 89.
140. State Criminal Procedure, supra note 116, at 434.
141. See infra notes 142-55 and accompanying text. This rule should not encompass
situations where a defendant instructs trial counsel to assert the claim but the instruction
was disregarded. See Appellate Forfeitures, supra note 15, at 878-85 (where an indigent
defendant asks his lawyer to raise an issue on appeal and attorney refuses, preclusion of
claim on habeas would, under certain circumstances, constitute miscarriage of justice).
Thus the Sykes cause requirement would be met. Although the discussion addressed
appellate defaults such as those in Jones v. Barnes, see id. at 878-81 (citing Jones v.
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983)), the reasoning would also apply at the trial level. If defend-
ant can demonstrate that he objected to a decision, he should not be bound by it.
142. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91 n.14. The concurrence of Justice White, while expressing a
preference for the Noia approach, succincly concluded that deliberate bypass should not
be interpreted to require defendant's personal concurrence in his attorney's action or
inaction. See id. at 98 (White, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 94-95 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted that" '[a] rule which
would require the client's participation in every decision to object, or not to object, to
proffers of evidence would make a shambles of orderly procedure.'" Id. at 95 n.2 (quot-
ing United States ex rel. Allum v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 1973)). The
concurrence also accepted the converse proposition that some constitutional waivers are
excusable even when made by the client. See id, at 95. The "grisly" choice faced by Noia
himself was cited as an example. See id. at 95-96 n.3.
144. See id. at 95 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Frazier v. Roberts, 441 F.2d
1224, 1230 (8th Cir. 1971)). In Frazier, the search warrant issued was in violation of the
fourth amendment because it lacked both supporting information and a sworn affidavit.
See 441 F.2d at 1228. Justice Stevens would look to factors such as the competence of
counsel and the overall fairness of the proceeding in deciding whether to grant habeas
after a default. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J., concurring).
145. See Spritzer, supra note 113, at 508 (suggesting that some rights such as the right
to trial must be waived by the defendant personally). But see Yackle, The Reagan Ad-
ministration's Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 609, 647 n.175 (1983) (arguing
that the "vital flaw [in this approach] is that it calls for a principled basis for distinguish-
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concurrence devised a "bright line" approach linkiag the nature of the
right to the stage of the proceeding at which the default occurred. In the
Chief Justice's view, the deliberate bypass standard developed in Fay v.
Noia "was never designed for, and is inapplicable to, errors-even of con-
stitutional dimension-alleged to have been committed during trial."'14 6
Noia was called upon to decide whether to appeal or not; this he did
personally, though his lawyer may have been an adviser. 147 Similarly, in
Johnson v. Zerbst, 4 which supplied Fay v. Noia's component of knowing
and intelligent waiver,'49 defendant had to make his own decision as to
whether to represent himself or to have an attorney at his criminal
trial. 50 Thus, there are fundamental rights which can only be waived by
the habeas petitioner personally, but these are pre-trial and post-trial
rights that he is capable of understanding. 5 '
By contrast, trial decisions cannot be freighted with the requirement
that defendant be consulted and consent, Chief Justice Burger's concur-
rence concluded. First of all, "[tihe trial process simply does not permit
the type of frequent and protracted interruptions which would be neces-
sary" to secure such client approval." 2 Second, the type of claim arising
during the course of trial is generally too technical even for the intelligent
and educated layman to comprehend.' 53 Therefore, the new cause and
prejudice standard established in Sykes would govern defaults occurring
during the trial.'54
ing decisions that are not, or cannot be, delegated to defense counsel . . . . [I]t is most
unlikely that we can develop a satisfactory body of law on the point") (citations omitted);
see also Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The
Supreme Court Has Work To Do, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1978) (only counsel can recognize
the tactical consequences of failure to object) [hereinafter cited as Tague II].
146. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 92 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
147. Id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing Noia, 372 U.S. at 391).
148. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
149. See Noia, 372 U.S. at 439.
150. 304 U.S. at 464.
151. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 92-93 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
152. Id. at 93.
153. Id.; see Tague I, supra note 113, at 132-33. Professor Tague discusses instances
when an attorney may refrain from mentioning a tactical decision to his client because of
a legitimate concern that defendant may insist on pursuing a strategy which would back-
fire. But see Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1978), where a client showed
more legal acumen than an attorney later found to be ineffective under sixth amendment
standards. The defendant attempted to alert his lawyer to the basic constitutional defect
in a nonunanimous jury verdict. Id. at 879-80.
154. See Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976),
which involved a defendant who was tried in prison attire although he requested civilian
clothes from a jail officer prior to the trial. The officer did not grant the request; trial
counsel failed to raise the issue in court. Respondent then sought a writ of habeas corpus,
which was denied because the trial attorney had not made an appropriate objection on
the prison clothes issue. Id. at 512-13. In a footnote the Court suggested that no "funda-
mental right" was involved, and that no conscious surrender of a "known right" was
required in order to give a binding effect to strategy decisions by counsel. See id. at 508
n.3. It was unclear whether the trial/post-trial distinction was critical here. However,
Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977), set out
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The aggregate of these Sykes opinions indicates that counsel may effect
a unilateral and binding trial default, and may not evade a prohibition
against deliberate bypass by contending that his client was not consulted.
However, if this is the only distinction between deliberate bypass and
sandbagging, the core question of why the Court abandoned the bypass
approach and established an entirely new requirement governing trial
forfeitures remains unanswered.
Arguably, a loophole in Noia has been sealed. Yet that aim could have
been accomplished in one sentence, as Justice White's concurrence
demonstrated: "The bypass rule. . . as applied to events occurring dur-
ing trial, cannot always demand that the defendant himself concur in
counsel's judgment." '155 This simple modification would probably have
met with little resistance from any member of the Court. Indeed, Justice
Brennan's dissent in Sykes acknowledged that a trial forfeiture may bar
habeas corpus relief unless counsel intentionally relinquished the claim
with his client's participation "where possible."15 6 Even if the majority
had determined that Justice White's use of the qualifying phrase "cannot
always" might permit subterfuge, the word "always" could simply have
been eliminated. Noia would then have been secured against manipula-
tion without the necessity of developing the cause and prejudice
requirement. 157
Thus, the majority's emphasis on the sandbagging phenomenon pro-
vides a clue, but not an explanation of Sykes' purposes.' 58 On the one
hand, there has been a significant change of emphasis. The habeas court
now has discretion to grant review if petitioner shows cause and preju-
dice, whereas before the court had discretion to deny review if the state
showed deliberate evasion of its processes.' 59 More skepticism will be
shown in evaluating petitioner's explanation of the forfeiture."6
On the other hand, no automatic bar against intentional defaults has
been inaugurated. The majority took no position on whether the grant-
ing of habeas relief would be appropriate in cases where an applicant, like
Charles Noia, knowingly forfeited his claim for reasons other than tacti-
this "bright line" distinction with only post-trial defaults governed by Noia. See Francis,
431 U.S. at 157-58 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also Justice Powell's concurrence in
Estelle, 425 U.S. at 515 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The right involved here is a trial-
type right. As a consequence, an attorney's conduct may bind the client.").
155. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 98 (1977) (White, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. A shift in the burden of proof from the state striving to show deliberate evasion to
the habeas applicant striving to negate such evasion, see Sykes, 433 U.S. at 98 (white, J.,
concurring), could also have been accomplished in one sentence.
158. In Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), a Sykes successor, the discussion of
sandbagging is confined to a footnote: "[A] defendant's counsel may deliberately choose
to withhold a claim in order to 'sandbag'-to gamble on acquittal while saving a disposi-
tive claim in case the gamble does not pay off." Id. at 129 n.34.
159. See infra Pt. I.B.4.b. for further discussion of the current requirement that peti-
tioner demonstrate prejudice.
160. See L. Yackle, supra note 137, § 83, at 338.
1985]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
cal advantage.1 61 Moreover, the Court underscored the flexibility of the
cause and prejudice requirement by pointing out that this rule would not
prevent a federal habeas court from considering the constitutional claim
of a defendant who has been the victim of a miscarriage of justice. 162
Despite the Court's express intention to circumscribe Noia and to dis-
courage sandbagging, intentional forfeitures remain-as they were
before 16 3-unlikely but not ineligible candidates for the writ. We there-
fore proceed to consider the implications of the Sykes agenda for inadver-
tent defaults.
c. Diminishing the Distinction Between Intentional and Inadvertent
Forfeitures
A threshold problem with viewing Sykes as concerned only with inten-
tional forfeitures is that in some cases counsel's conduct cannot be confi-
dently labeled as either purposeful or inadvertent."64 Indeed, the Justices
could not agree on a category for John Sykes' counsel. The majority
merely noted that no explanation was given for the failure to object to the
admission of testimony about defendant's statement to the police.' 6 Jus-
tice Stevens' concurrence, however, carefully examined counsel's deci-
sion and concluded that there was probably a strategic reason for the
failure.
John Sykes' statement, the concurrence pointed out, was to a great
extent in harmony with his trial testimony and in fact somewhat en-
hanced his defense because it demonstrated that he was a victim of prov-
ocation. 166 This might have persuaded the jury to convict him of a lower
degree of murder. Police officers gave Sykes the appropriate warnings,
and any claim that he was too intoxicated to understand them would
have been inconsistent with his ability to recall the circumstances of the
shooting. Even if a trial objection had been made and sustained, the
161. Noia involved the appellate stage of a criminal proceeding, which may distinguish
the case from one involving a trial default. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88 n.12. But see
Appellate Forfeitures, supra note 15, at 871-77 (acknowledging this distinction but con-
cluding that Sykes nevertheless applies to defaults at the appellate stage). Yet the refer-
ence to the Noia facts may also reflect a recognition that it would be inappropriate to
penalize an applicant facing a choice between two intolerable alternatives. Noia, 372 U.S.
at 440. See supra note 138.
162. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91. In a similar vein, Justice Stevens' concurrence
quotes with approval a lower court holding that even a deliberate choice by trial counsel
should not preclude relief when "the result would be unjust." Id. at 94-95 n. I (Stevens,
J., concurring).
163. See supra note 51.
164. See Hill I, supra note 73, at 984; Tague 1, supra note 113, at 155-56. See also
Yackle, supra note 145, at 660 n.240, explaining the conflict felt by trial counsel testifying
in subsequent collateral evidentiary hearings. Such counsel may face the choice of admit-
ting embarrassing lapses or of impeding their former clients' habeas petitions by proffer-
ing strategic reasons for trial defaults.
165. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 75.
166. See id. at 96 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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statement would have been admissible for impeachment purposes. 6'
While Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion stated that habeas courts
will be able to distinguish between intentional and inadvertent de-
faults,'68 he rejected Justice Stevens' analysis of counsel's motivation.
Finding a possible tactical reason for the forfeiture "most implausible,"
he concluded that the Sykes case was a "typical" example of
inadvertence.
169
The majority may have been reluctant to leave the deliberate bypass
standard in place because it would encourage the habeas applicant and
his counsel to proffer self-serving characterizations of the trial forfeiture
as inadvertent in order to receive an exemption from the Noic penalty."'
Even if we assume, however, that most defaults are in fact the result of
error,"17 the remaining question is whether the Court's establishment of
the cause and prejudice requirement signals an end to the automatic
granting of review to such defaults.
Some erosion in the intention/error dichotomy occurred even before
the Sykes decision was rendered. The antecedent opinions in Davis v.
United States"12 and Francis v. Henderson"" did not appear to define
cause as synonymous with inadvertence. In Davis, the district court held
that lack of due diligence explained but did not excuse the default, and
this conclusion was affirmed by the court of appeals and subsequently by
the Supreme Court. 7 In Francis, the court of appeals did find that since
petitioner had been represented by "a civil lawyer, unskilled in the intri-
cacies of criminal practice," 171 cause had been demonstrated, although
prejudice had not. 17 6 This finding was left undisturbed by the Supreme
167. See id. at 96-97 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971), which held that a statement that would be inadmissible against defendant
because of a violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), could nevertheless be
used to impeach him if he took the stand).
168. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 101 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent further indicated its high thresh-
old for a finding of strategic forfeiture by using as examples several cases where the trial
judge had expressly pointed out the potential constitutional claim to the defense, or
where counsel had raised such a claim and abandoned it. See id. at 104-05 (citing Murch
v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41, 43 (1972); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448 n.3 (1965);
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963)).
170. See Justice O'Connor's reference in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982), to
trial counsel's "alleged" unawareness of the constitutional claim, discussed infra notes
222-26 and accompanying text.
171. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting); L. Yackle, supra note 137,
§ 83, at 338. See also infra note 394.
172. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
173. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
174. Davis, 411 U.S. at 238, 243. It should be noted, however, that Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion in Davis also expressed special concern about deliberate manipulation of
court rules. See id at 241.
175. Newman v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 896, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom.
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
176. Id. at 898. The court of appeals vacated and remanded the case to allow a deter-
mination of whether the facts showed "prejudice." Id. at 899.
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Court, but the majority did not indicate that inadvertence would always
satisfy the cause requirement. Indeed, Justice Brennan's Francis dissent
expressed dismay about the Court's approval of a waiver which "would
apparently take effect . . . whether or not mere inadvertence . . . ac-
counted for the untimely challenge." '177
Yet a head count of the Justices who have directly addressed the issue
indicates that the ultimate application of the cause test to unintentional
defaults may be a close question. Chief Justice Burger's view was indi-
cated in a companion case to Davis, Estelle v. Williams.'78 The petitioner
in Estelle had been in prison clothing during his state court prosecution;
while a jailer had rejected his request to wear street clothing, no such
request and no such objection was made at trial.'79 The Chief Justice's
opinion for the Court held that petitioner had not been compelled to
wear jail clothing, and therefore no habeas corpus relief was war-
ranted. 180 He added in a footnote that there would be no significant dif-
ference between a failure resulting from strategy and one resulting from
negligence: "It is not necessary, if indeed it were possible, for us to de-
cide whether this was a defense tactic or simply indifference."',81
By contrast, Justice White's concurring opinion in Sykes opted to
equate cause with deliberate bypass,'82 and stated that defaults which are
not a result of conscious determination, "such as ignorance of the appli-
cable rules, would be sufficient to excuse the failure."' 83 Justice Stevens'
concurrence would limit binding forfeitures to reasonable decisions not
to object. 184
The split among the Justices with respect to treatment of inadvertent
defaults becomes most evident in the Sykes dissenting opinion. Justices
Brennan and Marshall identified the application of the new standard to
177. Francis, 425 U.S. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
179. Id. at 509-10. There was evidence that the judge generally permitted "any ac-
cused who so desired to change into civilian clothes." Id. at 510.
180. See id. at 512-13. Had the trial court denied a request to wear street clothing,
there would have been a constitutional violation because prison garb might prejudice the
jury. Id. at 504, 512-13.
181. Id. at 512 n.9. Justice Powell's concurring opinion noted: "We generally disfavor
inferred waivers of constitutional rights. . . .That policy, however, need not be carried
to the length of allowing counsel for a defendant deliberately to forego objection to a
curable trial defect, even though he is aware of the factual and legal basis for an objec-
tion." Id. at 515 (Powell, J., concurring). This statement could of course be read as
limited to the facts in Estelle, which arguably involved a trial strategy of seeking to evoke
jury sympathy. Or, Justice Powell's reluctance to countenance inferred waivers could
presage a reluctance to penalize an inadvertent error.
182. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 98 (White, J., concurring). A rider is attached, clarifying appli-
cation of the test to decisions as to which defendant was not consulted: "The bypass rule
.cannot always demand that the defendant himself concur in counsel's judgment."Id.
183. Id. at 99 (White, J., concurring).
184. See id. at 95-96 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's views are discussed
infra at notes 222-26 and accompanying text in the context of her opinion for the Court
in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), a Sykes descendant.
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such defaults as a "key issue" in the interpretation of cause and preju-
dice.185 Concluding that "no standard stricter than Fay's deliberate-by-
pass test" should be imposed,' 86 they went on to anticipate counter-
arguments to this view. Examination of the dissent's analysis will illus-
trate the Justices' divergent positions.
While acknowledging the value of encouraging the proffer of objec-
tions at the time when a trial error can still be cured, the dissent con-
tended that denying subsequent habeas review is pointless. Loss of all
state remedies would be sufficient to "induce greater care and cau-
tion."' 87 In any event, "unintentional action of any kind generally is not
subject to deterrence." 188
One commentator has suggested that unintentional forfeitures can be
deterred to some extent and offered an analysis of why such forfeitures
occur.'89 Overburdened and underpaid attorneys may spend too little
time on each case, and make too little effort to supplement their knowl-
edge of new legal developments. Eliminating habeas review is "not likely
to decrease materially" the number of defaults, however, because counsel
may be unwilling to pay the personal or professional costs which would
be required to reduce his caseload and continue his legal education."' A
salutary recommendation is made: States could use both the carrot and
the stick to induce counsel to be more careful.'' Increased funding for
court-appointed attorneys 92 -a critical corollary to a stricter forfeiture
rule--should be combined with disciplinary action against inveterate de-
185. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 100 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 112 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 113 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see infra note 384 and accompanying
text for examples of strategic bypass.
188. Id. at 113 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This assumption is not shared by legislatures
that devise criminal penalties for reckless or negligent acts. See, eg., New York Penal
Law §§ 125.10, 125.15, 15.05(3), 15.05(4) (McKinney 1975) (criminally negligent homi-
cide, manslaughter and definitional provisions).
In the context of trial defaults, attorneys may strive to avoid being personally embar-
rassed by being named in a decision critical of their trial errors. See, eg., Johns v. Perini,
462 F.2d 1308, 1310, 1314-15 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972).
189. See Defaulted Constitutional Claims, supra note 113, at 1006.
190. Id. The Note suggests that these costs may be loss of time for other professional
or personal activities and enrollment fees for courses in continuing legal education. See
iAd The author concludes that habeas review should always be available for claims inad-
vertently defaulted. See id. at 1004; see also Seidman, supra note 110, at 467 (arguing
that "[t]he financial realities of criminal defense work may make it more profitable for an
attorney to 'lose' quickly than to pursue every conceivable remedy for his client").
191. See Defaulted Constitutional Claims, supra note 113, at 1000-02.
192. Id at 1000. Thus, individual public defender caseloads would be decreased be-
cause a larger staff would be available. More talented and experienced lawyers would be
attracted to public defender offices and accept court appointment of cases involving indi-
gent defendants. See id at 1000-01. Justice O'Connor has concluded that because the
need for representation of the indigent cannot be met only by legal services offices or low
cost clinics, attorneys must recognize their social responsibilities by volunteering their
services where necessary. O'Connor, Legal Education and Social Responsibility, 53 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 659, 661 (1985).
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faulters. 9 3 Such state action would directly affect attorneys who repre-
sent criminal defendants.
By contrast, denial of a federal writ has a direct impact on the client
rather than his lawyer. 194 Justice Brennan's dissent in Sykes therefore
concluded that such a sanction is "misdirected" as to inadvertent de-
faults but not, paradoxically, as to intentional ones. 95 While a defense
attorney must be given authority to conduct the trial without consulta-
tion on each point, no federal habeas consequence should attach unless
the attorney "knowingly applied his professional judgment in his client's
behalf."196
The power of counsel to bind his client, Justice Brennan pointed out, is
more appropriate in a civil than a criminal case. 97 A lawyer in civil
litigation may be considered an agent acting on behalf of a principal,
consensually vested with authority to bind that principal. Conversely,
counsel for an indigent criminal defendant is often imposed on him
rather than selected by him.' 98 The dissent's thesis was that the habeas
applicant should not be penalized for his lawyer's errors because he has
not authorized them and cannot control them. The difficulty with this
thesis is that it proves too much. The indigent whose counsel negligently
defaults on a constitutional claim has not retained such counsel, but
193. Defaulted Constitutional Claims, supra note 113, at 1002.
194. Indeed, state trial counsel may not be representing the defendant in his federal
habeas proceeding. See Committee on Civil Rights, Pending Legislation to Amend the
Federal Habeas Corpus Statutes, 35 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 124, 135 (1980). Nevertheless,
trial counsel may be motivated to secure his client's release either at trial, or in the event
of conviction at a later time when reprosecution would be difficult. He may also wish to
avoid personal criticism for trial errors. See supra note 188.
195. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 101-02, 113-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 114 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Perhaps the dissent's reference to the
appropriateness of denying federal relief if counsel exercised judgment "in his client's
behalf" implies a distinction between omissions which could benefit the client and those
which could not. The latter might escape penalty. This would parallel the tenuous differ-
entiation discussed supra in Pt. I.B.3.a. between "rational" and "irrational" decisions, a
differentiation not embraced by the Sykes majority and concurring Justices. In any event,
the convicted defendant has derived no "benefit" from counsel's default regardless of the
reasons for it.
197. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 114 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 114 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also discussion of the possible disadvan-
tages of being represented by assigned counsel in Spritzer, supra note 113, at 509; Straz-
zella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, New Problems, 19 Ariz. L. Rev.
443, 455-56 (1977); Note, Habeas Corpus-Limiting the Availability of Habeas Corpus
After A Procedural Default, 73 J. of Crim. Law and Criminology 1612, 1636 n.168
(1982); Note, Habeas Corpus-The Supreme Court Defines the Wainwright v. Sykes
"Cause" and "Prejudice" Standard, 19 Wake Forest L. Rev. 441, 462 (1983). The Sykes
dissent also argues that penalizing inadvertent errors would mean that the state, which
drafts rules of procedure and decides which attorneys shall be admitted to practice,
would in essence "determine whether a habeas applicant will be permitted the access to
the federal forum that is guaranteed him by Congress." Sykes, 433 U.S. at 107 (Brennan,
I., dissenting). This conclusion overlooks the sixth amendment limitations on the effect
of an unlucky' assignment of counsel. See infra notes 253-59 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the cause and prejudice requirement does not apply unless the state procedural
rule violated by the habeas applicant is valid. See infra note 297.
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neither has the indigent fortuitously represented by a deliberate manipu-
lator of state procedures. In both cases, defendant may lack the technical
knowledge to instruct his attorney on the handling of trial issues; 199 in
both, denial of habeas review primarily affects the client rather than the
lawyer.20°
Protection of the client against such a consequence could of course be
accomplished by a no-forfeitures rule which would provide for automatic
granting of federal habeas review and disposition of the petition on the
merits."°1 This approach would not only directly contravene the state
interests cited by the majority, 2 but would have significant implications
for the congressionally mandated policy that state remedies must be ex-
hausted before the writ issues.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), the habeas petitioner must resort to effec-
tive remedies "available in the courts of the State." °3 This provision
refers to corrective procedures which are still available at the time peti-
tioner applies to the habeas court for relief.2" The exhaustion require-
ment permits states the first opportunity to determine the validity of
199. See supra note 153 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chief Justice Bur-
ger's Sykes concurrence on this point.
200. One possible impact on counsel if habeas review is denied on the basis of an inex-
cusable default would be a malpractice suit. Cf. Tague I, supra note 113, at 155 (noting
possible result of ineffective representation).
201. Another approach would be to require defendant's advance consent to all binding
forfeitures, but this was precisely what the Sykes concurring Justices rejected because
consultation on the numerous legal points which arise during the trial proceeding would
be impracticable. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 93 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 94-95 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). See supra notes 143, 152 and accompanying text. The dissenting
Justices also seemed to acknowledge the validity of this conclusion. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at
116 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 156 and accompanying text. In addition,
such client authorization may in some cases be only a nominal consent. Chief Justice
Burger's concurrence suggested that even an educated layman may not be in a position to
understand and to participate meaningfully in decisions about technical trial issues. See
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 93 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 345 (1963)). See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
202. See supra Pt. I.B.3.a.
203. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982). Similarly, subsection (c) provides that an applicant
shall not be deemed to have exhausted state remedies "if he has the right ... to raise, by
any available procedure, the question presented." Id. § 2254(c).
Section 2254 codified the Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241
(1886), where a state defendant sought pre-trial habeas on the grounds that he had been
indicted under an unconstitutional statute. Id. at 242-45. The Court acknowledged the
federal judicial power to entertain the petition, but held that as a matter of comity the
writ had been properly dismissed pending consideration of the issue at the state trial. See
id. at 252-54. But see Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 403-06 (1959) (section 2254 requires
exhaustion); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 210-14 (1950) (same); Ex parte Hawk, 321
U.S. 114, 116-17 (1944) (per curiam) (same).
204. Noia, 372 U.S. at 434-35, so interpreted § 2254(b) and Sykes did not disturb this
finding. Nor did either decision dispose of the petition merely by holding that because
petitioner had failed to comply with state rules at the time of trial, he could not be heard
to complain that exhaustion was no longer possible.
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challenges to state convictions, 20 5 and the Supreme Court has described
it as "rooted in considerations of federal-state comity" and based on " 'a
proper respect for state functions.' "206 A judicial ruling that a petitioner
who fails to follow state procedures available at the time of trial will
therefore never have to exhaust them would not literally violate the fed-
eral provision. However, such a pronouncement would hardly demon-
strate respect for state functions, or for the congressional intent
evidenced in the habeas corpus statute.
The Sykes dissenters seemed to prefer a system which would immunize
any client from penalty arising out of counsel's default, but the division
they proposed between intentional and nonintentional forfeitures27
would not achieve that aim. The majority, recognizing that automatic
immunity would be inappropriate, developed a different approach which
centered on the reasons for the trial attorney's default and the harm aris-
ing from that default,20 8 rather than on a distinction between bypass and
inadvertence.
The Court stressed its concern that cause and prejudice be interpreted
so as to prevent a miscarriage of justice." 9 The majority appears to have
concluded that this concern may well require looking beyond labels.
Thus, some deliberate defaults should still lead to the granting of re-
view;21° some inadvertent defaults should not if the degree of prejudice is
slight. 211
Yet without a more precise definition of cause and prejudice, neither
the Sykes purpose of "narrowing" the prior Noia standard nor its pur-
pose of avoiding miscarriages of justice can be implemented. As will be
seen below, 212 an undefined threshold test may lead to judicial "bypass,"
with circuit courts reaching the merits of habeas petitions rather than
risking misapplication of the standard.21 3 Moreover, those courts which
do attempt to apply the new rule will remain in conflict with each other,
and will therefore be unable to provide uniformly fair results to federal
litigants.
205. See O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts
from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 801, 814-15 (1981).
206. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). See supra notes 67, 69.
207. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 101-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 91.
209. Id. at 90-91.
210. The Court refrained from concluding that as to the facts in Noia, and the choice
presented there between accepting a life term or risking a death sentence, habeas should
be barred merely because the choice was deliberate. See id. at 88 n.12.
211. See the standard suggested infra at Pt. II. which would link habeas review of
negligently defaulted claims to the degree of prejudice demonstrated by petitioner.
212. See infra Pt. I.D.
213. See Tague II, supra note 145, at 21-22.
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4. The Progeny of Sykes
Additional ramifications of the Sykes test emerged in Engle v. Isaac'1 4
and United States v. Frady.2" 5 Isaac provides further grist for determin-
ing whether and when inadvertence constitutes cause, while Frady inter-
prets the prejudice prong of the test. Both supply valuable insight into
the link between the Sykes requirement and the habeas petitioner's
innocence.
a. Isaac and Cause
In Engle v. Isaac, three habeas applicants who were respondents in the
Supreme Court had been convicted in unrelated cases, but each had
failed to comply with an Ohio rule mandating contemporaneous objec-
tions to erroneous jury instructions concerning self-defense. t6 Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the majority stressed the importance of the
state's interest in prompt assertions of alleged constitutional error at a
criminal trial, and balanced the "honored position" of habeas corpus
against the writ's "significant costs."2 7 These costs include not only fi-
nality concerns, but also frustration of the state's primary responsibility
to define crimes and punish them.2 8 Habeas intervention may overturn
a conviction at a time when reprosecution may be difficult or impossible.
214. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
215. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
216. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982). Isaac was indicted on a charge of feloni-
ous assault for the severe beating of his ex-wife's male friend. Respondent claimed self-
defense, arguing that the victim had initiated the fight. Isaac was ultimately convicted of
the lesser offense of aggravated assault. Id. at 114. Respondent Bell was indicted for
aggravated murder. He was one of a group of bartenders who had agreed to aid one
another. Bell responded to such a call, and was told that the men causing the disturbance
had left. He followed them, shooting one of the men. Bell's defense was that a bartender
had warned him that a member of the party had a gun. Id. at 113. Respondent Hughes
was also charged with aggravated murder. He had shot and killed a male friend of his
former girlfriend. Hughes contended that the victim, who was larger than he, had
touched his pocket while coming towards Hughes. Id. at 112. All three respondents
challenged their convictions on the grounds that Ohio had changed the burden of proving
self-defense, shifting it to the prosecution once defendant has introduced some initial evi-
dence on this issue. Id. at 110- 11. At trial, however, jury instructions placed the burden
of proof as to self-defense on the respondents rather than on the state. Id. at 112-14.
217. See id. at 126-28.
218. Id. at 127-28. In addition, Justice O'Connor noted, the morale of state judges
suffers when their work is redone by their federal counterparts. Id. at 128 n.33; see also
O'Connor, supra note 205, at 814-15 (federal courts should "defer to the state courts and
give finality to their judgments on federal constitutional questions where a full and fair
adjudication has been given in the state court") (emphasis in original). The Isaac major-
ity also adopted the suggestion of Judge Henry J. Friendly of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and Professor Paul J. Bator that absence of finality frus-
trates deterrence and rehabilitation because the former depends on swift and certain pun-
ishment and the latter on the convicted defendant's knowledge that he is in need of
rehabilitation. See Isaac, 456 U.S. at 127-28 n.32 (citing Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963);
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 142, 146 (1970)).
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Yet a defendant's prior procedural default has prevented both trial and
appellate courts from correcting constitutional defects.219
Respondents attempted to meet the cause requirement by arguing that
although it was later held that Ohio could not constitutionally shift the
burden of proving self-defense to them, they were unable to anticipate
this due process defect at the time of their trials.220 Furthermore, they
urged that objection would have been futile because Ohio traditionally
required defendants to prove this affirmative defense.221 Much of the
majority's opinion explored the circumstances under which the failure to
raise a novel claim becomes a binding forfeiture. In the course of this
exploration, several references were made to the effect of an inadvertent
default. Justice O'Connor noted:
Counsel might have overlooked or chosen to omit respondents' due
process argument while pursuing other avenues of defense. We have
long recognized, however, that the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants only a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does not in-
sure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable
constitutional claim. Where the basis of a constitutional claim is avail-
able, and other defense counsel have perceived and litigated that claim,
the demands of comity and finality counsel aainst labeling alleged un-
awareness of the objection as cause ....
This passage can be interpreted as establishing the fungibility of "over-
looking" and "choosing. ' 223 Or, the thrust of it may be that where a
claim is in the public domain, an allegation of unawareness would be
difficult to credit and therefore insufficient to meet the cause
requirement. 224
Under the first interpretation, the majority was expressing a basic doc-
trinal conclusion that the costs of the writ may outweigh the costs of
219. See Isaac, 456 U.S. at 127-28.
220. Id. at 130. See infra notes 356-58, 369 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Court's treatment of the novelty issue.
221. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 130. In a footnote, the Court found that the decision to with-
hold a claim on grounds of futility resembles a deliberate bypass. Because the cause and
prejudice standard is "more demanding" than the Noia test, futility cannot constitute
cause per se. Id. at 130 n.36.
222. Id. at 133-34. The majority also held: "We do not suggest that every astute coun-
sel would have relied upon Winship to assert the unconstitutionality of a rule saddling
criminal defendants with the burden of proving an affirmative defense. Every trial
presents a myriad of possible claims." Id. at 133. Because the Court follows this passage
by noting that counsel might have overlooked or discounted this line of defense, id. at
133-34, it can be read as a comment on the difference between incompetent counsel and
counsel who negligently fails to raise a claim. Even an "astute" attorney could forget one
of a panoply of possible defenses. See L. Yackle, supra note 137, § 86, at 177 (Supp.
1984).
223. The Government's amicus curiae brief argued that the cause requirement cannot
be satisfied merely by contending that the failure to object was an oversight. See Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12-16, Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Isaac,
456 U.S. at 133-34; L. Yackle, supra note 137, § 86, at 170 (Supp. 1984).
224. See L. Yackle, supra note 137, § 86, at 178 (Supp. 1984).
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penalizing counsel's error; thus, district courts should not automatically
equate cause with inadvertence. Under the second interpretation, the
Court was merely expressing skepticism about the assertion of ignorance
proferred by Isaac's trial counsel, yet this narrower finding would also
have significant implications for future inadvertence cases.
Such cases would now require a more searching look at whether coun-
sel had in fact forgotten the constitutional objection; his statement of
ignorance would not suffice. Moreover, if assertions of unawareness are
regarded as questionable with respect to a newly emerging constitutional
claim,22 as in Isaac, these assertions would be even more difficult to
credit when the claim is a familiar one. 26
Isaac also addressed the central question of how the Sykes standard
relates to the defendant's guilt or innocence. Respondents had urged
that this standard should apply only to cases in which the defect would
not affect the truth-finding process.227 On the one hand, Justice
O'Connor rejected this contention, noting that "[t]he costs outlined
above do not depend upon the type of claim raised by the prisoner.
While the nature of the claim may affect the calculation of cause and
actual prejudice, it does not alter the need to make that threshold show-
ing." '228 On the other hand, the language of the rejection sustained the
propriety of according leniency when the new requirement is applied to
violations which affect the petitioner's innocence. This reading of the
majority's view is strengthened by a statement later in the decision:
"[W]e are confident that victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice
will meet the cause-and-prejudice standard. 229
Thus, three levels of scrutiny may be envisioned in making the "calcu-
225. See infra Pt. II.B. . for a further discussion of the Court's treatment of novelty
claims.
226. In a terse footnote, the Isaac majority made one further reference to inadvertence:
"Counsel's default may stem from simple ignorance or the pressures of trial. We noted in
Sykes, however, that a defendant's counsel may deliberately choose to withhold a claim in
order to 'sandbag'-to gamble on acquittal while saving a dispositive claim in case the
gamble does not pay off." Isaac, 456 U.S. at 129 n.34. On its face, this reference does no
more than describe two possible reasons for a failure to make an objection. The second
reason received more emphasis and implicitly more censure. However, in the context of
the holding that counsel's claim of ignorance does not constitute cause, the footnote may
be a further indication that Justice O'Connor did not consider the distinction between
inadvertence and deliberate bypass to be critical.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist joined Justice
O'Connor's opinion. See id. at 109. But see Sykes, 433 U.S. at 98-99 (White, J., concur-
ring) (endorsing the distinction between deliberate and inadvertent failure). See also supra
Pt. I.A. for a discussion of the Court's equivocal handling of inadvertence in Reed v.
Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984), in which Justices White and Powell joined in the majority.
227. See Isaac, 456 U.S. at 129. The respondents emphasized that, unlike the Miranda
violations claimed in Sykes which did not affect the determination of guilt, the allegedly
erroneous jury instructions on self-defense related directly to the guilt or innocence of the
prisoners. See id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 135. Note that both prongs of this standard are described as more easily
satisfied by an arguably innocent defendant. Nevertheless, Isaac held that both prongs
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lation" to which the majority referred: (1) lenient, where defendant
makes a colorable showing of innocence;2 30 (2) median, where the impact
of the alleged constitutional violation on the truth-finding processes at
trial is speculative;2 31 (3) strict, where the constitutional violation in-
voked has no relation to defendant's innocence.232
b. Frady and Prejudice
The unadorned reference to "actual prejudice" approved in Sykes was
given additional embellishment by Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
majority in United States v. Frady,23 3 which involved an admittedly
guilty habeas applicant. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder
after an exceptionally brutal "hit man" killing,234 and his claim reached
the Supreme Court nineteen years after the crime occurred. Frady, the
respondent, conceded that the evidence against him was "overwhelm-
ing" 235 but argued that jury instructions given without objection at his
trial in a District of Columbia court constituted "plain error" under Rule
52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure because they improp-
erly precluded the possibility of a manslaughter verdict.2 36
On direct appeal of a federal conviction, the "plain error" doctrine23 7
may override the requirement that a defendant make a contemporaneous
objection to erroneous jury instructions. 238  A default would therefore
not be binding. Justice O'Connor noted that the "plain error" to which
Rule 52(b) refers must affect substantial rights, and becomes operative
"'if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fair-
ness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' "239 Respon-
dent urged that the same standard should govern a federal prisoner's
must be separately met. See id. at 134 n.43. See the discussion of miscarriage of justice in
the definitional portion of this Article, infra Pt. II.
230. See infra Pt. II.A.1.
231. See infra Pt. II.A. 1.
232. See infra Pt. II.A.
233. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
234. Frady and his accomplice were covered with the dead man's blood when they
were captured by the police while fleeing from the victim's residence. The deceased's
neck and chest had wounds from the metal heel plates on Frady's boots, and one of his
eyes had been knocked out. Id. at 154-55.
235. Respondent had filed a pro se brief in the circuit court containing this admission.
Id. at 156 & n.l. However, he had denied his guilt at trial, stating that the real murderer
had escaped while the police were apprehending the respondent. Id.
236. Id. at 157-58. The death sentence was imposed on Frady, but it was set aside in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and he was resentenced
to life imprisonment. Id. at 156-57. Frady sought to vacate this sentence, claiming that if
the jury had been properly instructed on the meaning of malice, he might have been
convicted only of manslaughter. Id. at 157-58.
237. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) states that "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
238. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30 provides in part that objections to jury instructions must be
presented "before the jury retires to consider its verdict."
239. Frady, 456 U.S. at 163 n.13 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160
(1936)).
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collateral challenge.2 4"
The majority rejected this argument, holding that once a defendant has
completed the appellate process and has had an adequate opportunity to
present his claims, a presumption that his conviction is proper arises.2 4'
The Court reaffirmed that the burden of establishing plain error on col-
lateral review is "'even greater'" than would be required on direct ap-
peal.242 Thus, an erroneous jury instruction would not aid respondent
unless he could meet the Sykes test.243
The plain error doctrine and the concept of miscarriage of justice were
linked several times in the course of the majority's decision.2  Plain er-
ror, however, stems from the nature of the challenged violation, while
miscarriage of justice appears to relate directly to the question of the
habeas applicant's innocence. Justice O'Connor stated: "We perceive no
risk of a fundamental miscarriage of justice in this case."245 She empha-
sized that such a conclusion would not have been reached if Frady had
presented affirmative evidence indicating that he was innocent of the
240. Id. at 162-64. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982) provides for collateral attack on a federal
conviction. If the applicant alleges that sentence was imposed in violation of the Consti-
tution, he may move in the sentencing court for relief. The court may "vacate, set aside,
or correct the sentence." Id.
241. Frady, 456 U.S. at 164. Justice Blackmun's concurrence concluded that comity
does not apply to federal prisoners and that finality is also irrelevant because the plain
error doctrine constitutes an exception to Fed. R. Crim. P. 30's mandate that timely
objections to instructions be made. Id. at 176-77 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 166 (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)) (emphasis in
original). The majority acknowledged that Kibbe involved a state rather than a federal
court conviction, and that therefore comity and federalism were implicated. Nevertheless,
the Court held that finality was of equal concern to both federal and state forums. See id.
at 166. In any event, Frady had had the opportunity to present his claims in federal trial
and appellate courts. Id.
The technical support for the majority's holding was extensively criticized by the dis-
sent. Justice Brennan charged that the majority's opinion had failed to consider "the
explicit congressional distinction between § 2254, a civil collateral review procedure for
state prisoners, and § 2255, a criminal collateral review procedure for federal prisoners."
Id. at 181 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, the
federal collateral attack should not be governed by a different rule than appeal of a fed-
eral conviction, because both would be part of the original criminal proceeding. Id. at
184.
243. See id. at 167-69.
244. The Court stated that Rule 52(b), which governs plain error, "was intended to
afford a means for the prompt redress of miscarriages of justice," id. at 163 (footnote
omitted), and quoted lower courts' holdings that the rule should be utilized "sparingly,
solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result,"
id. at 163 n.14. This seems to equate the two concepts; indeed, Jutice Blackmun's con-
currence suggested that recognition of the plain error doctrine on collateral review would
not conflict with the Sykes requirement. See id. at 175 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
On the other hand, the majority also referred with approval to reversal of errors which
are obvious. See id at 163. Thus, plain error would apply even where no miscarriage of
justice has occurred. This interpretation would be consonant with the Court's conclusion
that the burden of overcoming a prior failure to make a trial objection is greater on
collateral than on direct review. See id. at 166.
245. Id. at 172.
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homicide for which he.was convicted. z46
The majority also concluded that respondent had been unable to show
that "he suffered such . . prejudice that reversal of his conviction 19
years later could be justified. ' 247 Prejudice was defined as a test of actu-
ality, not possibility. The habeas petitioner must show that errors of con-
stitutional dimension substantially disadvantaged him248 and "so infected
the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. ' 249 The
fact that a jury instruction is invalid is insufficient; the judge's entire
charge to the jury and the "total context of the events at trial" must be
assessed.2
It is significant that the Court used the term "innocent" in two senses,
both of which can form the basis for a finding of prejudice. 251 Defendant
may be altogether innocent of the crime with which he is charged. Or, he
may be innocent of the degree of the crime for which he was convicted,
but guilty of a lower degree which would carry a shorter sentence. Frady
failed even the second test, as he "never presented colorable evidence
.. .[of] such justification, mitigation, or excuse that would reduce his
crime from murder to manslaughter. 2 5
2
Innocence and prejudice are therefore more inclusive concepts than
miscarriage of justice. Prejudice may result from a constitutional error
substantially affecting the degree of the challenged conviction and the
246. See id. at 171.
247. Id. at 172. Note that the Frady Court did not reach the question of cause because
it disposed of respondent's claims on the grounds of prejudice, see id. at 175, while the
Isaac majority did not reach the question of prejudice because it disposed of respondents'
claims on the grounds of cause, see Isaac, 456 U.S. at 135. This reaffirms not only the
doctrinal matter of the severability of the two requirements, but also the practical corol-
lary that the district court may dispose of petitioner's case by dealing only with the weak-
est prong.
248. Frady, 456 U.S. at 170.
249. Id. at 169 (quoting with approval from Justice Stevens' opinion in Henderson v.
Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). But see Yackle, supra note 145, at 646 n. 170 (pointing
out that the Kibbe discussion concerned the requirements for finding a constitutional
violation rather than for hearing a constitutional claim).
250. Frady, 456 U.S. at 169.
251. Factual and legal guilt were not expressly distinguished. See infra notes 306-I1
and accompanying text.
252. Frady, 456 U.S. at 171. Frady did not argue at trial that he lacked malice at the
time of the murder. Rather, respondent claimed that he did not commit the crime. How-
ever, on appeal Frady dropped this theory in light of the overwhelming evidence against
him. The record indicated further that there was premeditation and "'malice aplenty.'"
Id. Prior to the murder, respondents were overheard discussing the fact that they were
hired to kill the deceased. Gloves were brought to the scene of the crime and there were
no finger prints on the weapon. Id. at 171-72. "Finally, there was the unspeakable bru-
tality of the killing itself." Id. at 172. See supra note 234. Justice Stevens in his concur-
rence similarly noted that Frady failed to demonstrate prejudice. See id. at 175 (Stevens,
J., concurring). Justice Brennan's dissent acknowledged this lack of prejudice, stating
that "if the Court had concluded that there was not 'plain' error, it might be difficult to
support a dissent from that conclusion, given the particular facts of this case." Id. at 187
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
(Vol. 53
HABEAS CORPUS AFTER STATE DEFA ULT
proportionality of defendant's sentence. This would be a subset of inno-
cence unlikely to rise to a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" level.
C. Incompetent Counsel and the Prejudice Definition
While the Supreme Court has not yet provided specific content for the
critical Sykes terminology, it has recently issued significant guidelines as
to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington" 3
interpreted the sixth amendment right to an attorney in all criminal pros-
ecutions, which in turn enhances the fundamental right to a fair trial.'
The Court provided an illuminating analysis of the degree of prejudice
that a defendant must show in order to invalidate a conviction because of
errors by counsel.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority noted that where counsel
has arguably been ineffective, a critical element required for a fair trial
may be missing.2" Thus, the government's interest in finality would be
weaker than in cases in which all the essential components of a "pre-
sumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present."256 The habeas
applicant must prove not only that his attorney's performance was defi-
cient but also that he was prejudiced by this deficiency."' However, the
test for prejudice is less stringent where the finality concern is more ques-
tionable. Rejecting a test which would require demonstrating by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that counsel's errors "determined the
outcome" of the trial,258 the Court held: "[D]efendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result . . . would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."25 9
The second sentence of this explanation is essential to dispel a miscon-
ception which might otherwise be created by the first. The words "rea-
sonable probability" might be read to be outcome-determinative-
253. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
254. Id at 2063. See Strickland's companion case, United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct.
2039, 2043 (1984).
255. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
256. Id. at 2068. Since the fundamental fairness of the proceeding is challenged, and
the finality interest diminished, ineffectiveness claims will be governed by the same stan-
dards on both direct and collateral review. Id. at 2070. The majority distinguished Frady
and Isaac, noting that "the presumption that a criminal judgment is final is at its strong-
est in collateral attacks on that judgment." Id.
257. Id. at 2068.
258. Id. Also rejected was a proposed test at the other end of the leniency spectrum,
which would merely have required a showing that the error affected the outcome, because
"[v]irtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test." Id. at 2067.
259. Id. at 2068. In United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984), Justice Stevens'
opinion for the majority identified several circumstances which are so likely to produce
prejudice that "the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." Id. at
2046-47. These include lack of counsel, lack of "meaningful adversarial testing," and
counsel's conflict of interest. Id. at 2047-48 & n.28.
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probably defendant would have been acquitted but for his lawyer's mis-
take. 6' Yet this is the very test that the majority found to be too strin-
gent. By defining a "reasonable probability" as one which undermines
confidence in the verdict, the Court was in effect requiring a reasonable
possibility rather than a probability that the result would have been
different.26
1
To what extent could the Strickland definition be serviceable for Sykes
situations, or alternatively, to what extent could the unsuitability of the
Strickland definition in such habeas situations aid in determining what
prejudice under Sykes should mean?162 Presume that Steel, a habeas pe-
titioner, has based his contention that trial counsel was incompetent on a
single egregious mistake.2 63 Another petitioner, Nickel, presents a con-
stitutional claim on which his attorney has defaulted at trial, but he ar-
gues that there was cause for the default.
Because the state's interest in finality would be much stronger in
Nickel's case, his burden of showing prejudice should be heavier than
Steel's. Frady stressed the respect due to a final judgment 26 and the
260. The word "probable" may be defined as "reasonably, but not certainly, to be...
expected." Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1959) (unabridged). How-
ever, it can also be understood to signify "[h]aving more evidence for than against." Id.
The Court does not seem to be using the word in the latter sense.
261. Strickland cites United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), as a precursor of the
"reasonable probability" test. See 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Justice Stevens in his opinion for
the majority in Agurs stated:
[If] omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist,
constitutional error has been committed. . . . If there is no reasonable doubt
about guilt . . . there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand if
the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively
minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-13.
262. Our inquiry into cause is not materially aided by rulings on incompetent counsel.
Deprivation of an attorney's effective assistance would be cause per se. See Sincox v.
United States, 571 F.2d 876, 880 (5th Cir. 1978); Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 132-
33 (8th Cir. 1977); Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506, 511 (5th Cir. 1977). See also infra
note 411. Conversely, counsel's failure-for example, a failure to ask for a jury instruc-
tion on manslaughter in a homicide case in order to compel the jury to choose between
acquittal and conviction for murder-might constitute neither incompetence nor cause.
See infra note 384 and accompanying text. Other defaults, such as one motivated by a
fear that making an objection would lead to consequences so punitive that reasonable
counsel would avoid it, see infra Pt. II.B.2., might meet the cause test but fall short of
establishing incompetence.
263. Generally, it is the totality of counsel's mistakes which leads to a sixth amend-
ment reversal of a conviction on direct appeal or the granting of the writ on collateral
review. See L. Yackle, supra note 137, § 86, at 196-97 (Supp. 1984). In some instances,
however, a single error may be sufficient. See, e.g., United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663,
666 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977) (failure of appointed attorney to
challenge search of defendant's home); Lufkins v. Solem, 554 F. Supp. 988, 993-96
(D.S.D.) (failure of defense counsel to seek hearing on issue of voluntariness of confes-
sion), afl'd, 716 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2667 (1984).
264. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164-65 (1982). While the Frady Court
referred particularly to federal convictions, a similar rationale as to state convictions was
set forth in Sykes. See 433 U.S. at 80.
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increased weight such a judgment gains on collateral attack.265 The con-
nection between finality and the stringency of the prejudice test was also
made: The required showing of prejudice is less demanding on direct
appeal than on habeas.2 66 The Strickland Court took the converse posi-
tion, relating the lowered interest in finality to a lighter prejudice burden
which would be the same on direct and collateral review.267
Strickland gives us a floor and a ceiling as to Nickel's burden. While
higher than the one mandated for ineffective counsel cases, it is lower
than the outcome-determinative test required, for example, in cases of
newly discovered evidence.2 68 In the latter situation, the defendant does
not attack the fairness of the completed trial, but instead urges that proof
subsequently found may demonstrate his innocence. Nickel, by contrast,
alleges that the defaulted claim was of constitutional dimension and in-
fected his entire trial. The appropriate prejudice test here will be dis-
cussed in detail in Part II.
D. The Need for an Operative Definition
In the court's most recent bout with the application of "cause and
actual prejudice," Reed v. Ross,269 there was for the first time unanimous
acceptance of this requirement as governing habeas claims barred in state
court by a procedural default. Ironically, it was also the first occasion on
which a majority of the Justices indicated that rather than furnish opera-
tive content for the critical terms, as was promised or at least predicted in
Sykes,2 70 the Court should continue to do without such precision. The
rationale offered in Justice Brennan's majority opinion was that there is a
"broad range of potential reasons for an attorney's failure to comply with
a procedural rule, and [a] virtually limitless array of contexts in which a
procedural default can occur. 2 71
Yet the dissenters in Sykes, now forming part of the majority in Ross,
unequivocally condemned the "undefined" nature of the burden that the
cause requirement places on habeas applicants, particularly the open
question of whether the burden could be discharged by "attorney igno-
rance or error beyond the client's control. 27 2 The amorphous prejudice
prong of the requirement was also criticized; Justices Brennan and Mar-
265. Frady, 456 U.S. at 164-65.
266. Id at 166.
267. See Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2070.
268. Id. at 2068.
269. 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984). See discussion of Reed v. Ross supra Pt. I.A.
270. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87, 91.
271. Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2909 (1984).
272. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 116-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Isaac, dissenting
Justices Brennan and Marshall criticized the majority's failure to keep its "promise" to
define cause and prejudice in later cases, and noted that the Court "still refuses to say
what 'cause' is ... [b]ut ... is more than eager to say what 'cause' is not." Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 144 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1985]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
shall noted that if prejudice were to be equated with harmless error,273
the habeas courts would have to review the petitioner's trial record and
could therefore as easily dispose of the petition on the merits as on the
Sykes criteria. 74
The continuing definitional vagueness has not had a salutary effect on
the lower federal courts. Some circuits have attempted to supply content
for the standard, but have reached conflicting results. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit, for example, has concluded that "ignorance and inadvertence can-
not form the basis for cause under Sykes, ' ' 275 while the Fifth Circuit has
ruled that nonstrategic attorney conduct constitutes cause.276
In addition to the split on the meaning of cause,2 77 lower courts have
273. If a petitioner demonstrates that a constitutional violation has occurred, the writ
may still be dismissed if the state can demonstrate that this violation was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt. See infra notes 328-33 and accompanying text.
274. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 177 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra note 338 and accompa-
nying text.
275. Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983). The circuit court ap-
proved the lower court's position on inadvertence but found for the defendant on other
grounds. Id. at 1575, 1583; see Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1471 (11 th Cir.) (attorney
unawareness of decision presenting constitutional claim does not establish "cause"), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 510 (1983); Dietz v. Solem, 677 F.2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1982) (respon-
dents' claims were far from unknown at time of their trials and thus cause prong was not
met); Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 844 n.6 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane) (Oakes, J.,
concurring) (in light of the Sykes decision, "inadvertence on the part of trial counsel
[does not meet] the Francis 'cause' standard"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978). Some
federal district courts have reached the same conclusion. See Porter v. Leeke, 457 F.
Supp. 253, 259 n.7 (D.S.C. 1978) ("[A]n extension of the 'cause-prejudice' standard to
situations involving inaction by counsel not rising to the level of malpractice would seem
to emasculate the contemporaneous objection rule entirely." If attorney ignorance consti-
tuted cause the exception would "swallow the rule.") (emphasis in original); Ramsey v.
United States, 448 F. Supp. 1264, 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (" 'inadvertence' and inefficiency
• ..[do] not constitute cause under Sykes"); United States v. Underwood, 440 F. Supp.
499, 502 (D.R.I. 1977) ("sheer inadvertence [does not] excuse the default").
276. Harris v. Spears, 606 F.2d 639, 644 (5th Cir. 1979). Other circuit courts have
reached similar conclusions. See Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396, 398 (4th Cir. 1983)
("under certain circumstances attorney error which is insufficient to make out a violation
of the sixth amendment may nevertheless constitute 'cause' "); Garrison v. McCarthy,
653 F.2d 374, 378 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[I]n cases involving attorney inadvertence or igno-
rance, a lesser showing of incompetency of counsel should be sufficient for 'cause.' ");
Jurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d 672, 683 (5th Cir. 1979) ("attorney misfeasance can constitute
'cause' "), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); Rachel v. Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200, 204
(6th Cir. 1978) ("failure to make timely objections. . . resulted from either inexperience,
inattention or lack of knowledge of the law"; cause prong therefore is met); Farrow v.
United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he degree of attorney inadver-
tence that would be necessary to constitute cause . . . would have to be resolved by
careful application of Sykes."); Collins v. Auger, 577 F.2d 1107, 1110 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978)
(dictum) (" 'lack of knowledge of the facts or law would be sufficient cause' ") (quoting
Collins v. Auger, 451 F. Supp. 22, 27-28 (S.D. Iowa 1977)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133
(1979).
277. See Goodman & Sallett, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower Federal Courts Re-
spond, 30 Hastings L. J. 1683, 1721 (1979). This split is also reflected in circuit court
decisions concerning federal prisoners challenging their convictions. Compare Indiviglio
v. United States, 612 F.2d 624, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing Davis v. United States, 411
U.S. 233 (1973), rather than Sykes as a basis for concluding that inadvertence is not cause
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produced divergent interpretations of prejudice."" Equally troubling is
the judicial "bypass" of the Sykes requirement, noted by several com-
mentators. 9 Rather than interpreting the presently undefined terminol-
ogy and thus risking reversal, lower courts have been summarily holding
against petitioners on the merits,280 relying on alternative grounds for
disposition of petitions,2"' or deciding the merits even after concluding
that there is no jurisdiction to do So.282
Casualties of the refusal to provide guidance are the litigants in these
lower court cases, whose rights vary in accordance with jurisdiction
rather than jurisprudence. The "importance, and even necessity of uni-
formity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all sub-
jects within the purview of the constitution" has been acknowledged by
the Supreme Court for more than a century.28 3
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 933 (1980) with United States v.
Hall, 565 F.2d 917, 920 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that inadvertence is cause under Fed. R.
Crim P. 12(f)'s "for cause shown" language).
278. Respondent in Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1001 (1981), had been convicted of second-degree murder in a New York state
court. Under police questioning, and in the absence of counsel, Forman had related two
different explanations for the killing, while denying his own guilt. These statements were
used during the trial to prove that he had in fact shot the victim. Respondent sought
habeas relief on sixth amendment grounds, claiming that his right to counsel during po-
lice questioning had not been waived. Id. at 641. In applying the Sykes prejudice test to
respondent's claim, the Second Circuit stressed "the significance of the evidence admitted
as a result of the constitutional error in relation to all the other evidence in the case." Id.
at 642. Under this definition, the prejudice prong was not met because of other "over-
whelming evidence of guilt." Id. Compare Forman with Myers v. Washington, 646 F.2d
355 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 456 U.S. 921 (1982), aff'd on rehearing, 702 F.2d 766 (9th
Cir. 1983), in which respondent was also convicted of second degree murder. The evi-
dence against him consisted of both a confession made to police and a similar statement
made to a television reporter. Id. at 356-57. Respondent challenged his conviction on a
number of grounds, including faulty jury instructions. The court granted the writ, find-
ing the prejudice prong to be met because of "the crucial role the challenged jury instruc-
tions could have played in securing appellant's conviction." Id. at 360. The prejudice
standard applied in Myers was much less stringent than that used in Forman. Another
court chose a "colorable showing of innocence" interpretation. Robertson v. Collins, 466
F. Supp. 262, 270 (D. Md. 1979) ("The prejudice standard [serves] to. . .prevent the
miscarriage ofjustice which results from convicting an innocent person.") (footnote omit-
ted), affid, 624 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 961 (1980); see L Yackle,
supra note 137, § 87, at 351-54; id. § 87, at 199-202 (Supp. 1984); Goodman & Sallet,
supra note 277, at 1700-07.
Goodman & Sallett point out that the colorable showing of innocence standard exam-
ines the question of factual guilt. Thus, the court would focus on both the tainted and
untainted evidence equally, ultimately determining if the petitioner's factual guilt is in
dispute. This standard may lead to different results than the legal guilt model utilized in
harmless error cases. See infra notes 306-11 and accompanying text. For example, in the
case of a Miranda claim, the tainted evidence may support the determination of guilt and
the writ would probably be denied. Goodman & Sallett, supra note 277, at 1700.
279. See infra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
280. L. Yackle, supra note 137, § 86, at 165 (Supp. 1984); Defaulted Constitutional
Claims, supra note 113, at 987 & n.53.
281. L. Yackle, supra note 137, § 84, at 340 & n.14.
282. Tague II, supra note 145, at 22.
283. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 345 (1816) (emphasis added).
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A coherent standard could promote uniformity in the development of
federal rights while still retaining sufficient flexibility to avoid miscar-
riages of justice. In the related area of ineffective assistance claims, the
Supreme Court was able to provide a precise core definition of the preju-
dice requirement which must be met by habeas petitioners.284 However,
the majority expressly declined to adopt a more complete standard which
had been suggested by the lower court for assessing incompetence, listing
several specific policy objections to such amplification.28 5 Examination
of these objections demonstrates that they do not present obstacles to
elaboration of a cause test.286
First, the Court noted that although the sixth amendment does not list
the components of effective assistance, the organized bar has issued stan-
dards that provide adequate guidance to lawyers. More detailed rules
would interfere with counsel's independence and distract him from vigor-
ous advocacy on behalf of his client.287
This rationale would be weaker in the context of defining cause for a
default. Such a definition, focusing on omissions, need not cover the
whole range of what constitutes trial competence. Advising the bar as to
when an omission is binding on a client in a later habeas proceeding
would not make counsel more dependent, merely better informed. If this
information induces him to make a trial objection rather than to remain
silent, it may contribute to more vigorous advocacy.288
The Court's next objection to the formulation of comprehensive com-
petence standards was that "the purpose of the effective assistance guar-
antee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal
representation, . . . [but] simply to ensure that criminal defendants re-
ceive a fair trial., 28 9 Thus, deterrence of manipulative or reckless behav-
ior was not relevent in Strickland.
This objection is inapplicable to the purpose of Sykes, in which Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the majority expressed concern about the effect
Martin, which rejected a challenge to Supreme Court jurisdiction over state court judg-
ments, did so on uniformity grounds equally applicable to federal judgments. See also Ex
parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 103 (1868) (habeas proceedings attain uniformity only
through appellate decisions); cf Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964) (same standard
in federal and state court for determining accused's fifth amendment privilege).
284. See supra Pt. I.C. discussing Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
285. See Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065-66 (1984). Justice Marshall
vigorously dissented, arguing that such malleable standards compel the judiciary to resort
to intuition. He concluded that merely advising attorneys to behave reasonably gives
them no guidance. Id. at 2075 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
286. As indicated supra at notes 255-59 and accompanying text, the Court recognized
the need for a precise definition of prejudice, and developed one in the context of the sixth
amendment.
287. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984).
288. See supra note 192 and accompanying text, discussing suggestions for enhancing
the level of criminal defense representation and deterring carelessness. Increased funding
for appointed attorneys has been identified as crucial to both aims.
289. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
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of the Noia standard on the conduct of defense lawyers.' ° The cause
and prejudice test was intended in part as a disincentive to counsel who
might withhold a constitutional claim at the trial level but introduce it on
collateral review at a time when reprosecution might be difficult.291
Finally, the Strickland majority opposed more detailed guidelines be-
cause they would "encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness chal-
lenges." '292 If defendant were convicted, "second trial[s]" concerning the
quality of counsel's defense would increase. 93
By contrast, elaboration of a cause definition would not create another
trial about counsel's conduct. In Strickland, the constitutional claim was
the attorney's defective performance; proof of the defect would have led
to the granting of the writ. In Sykes, the underlying constitutional claim
was not counsel's default but police conduct allegedly violative of the
fifth amendment. Defendant's decision to press for habeas review would
depend on the strength of this Miranda claim. Clarification of the cause
requirement would not enhance the underlying constitutional argument
and would therefore create no additional litigation.294
Thus, any negative side effects of formulating a more precise Sykes
standard do not outweigh the benefits of enhancing consistency in the
adjudication of federal rights. Such a standard could, of course, emanate
290. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89.
291. Id. at 88-89. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Sykes implicitly recognizes this re-
prosecution problem by pointing out that "contemporaneous objection enables the record
to be made ... when the recollections of witnesses are freshest, not years later in a
federal habeas proceeding. It enables the judge who observed the demeanor of those
witnesses to make the factual determinations." Id. at 88. Similarly, Justice O'Connor, in
her opinion for the Court in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982), states: "We
must also acknowledge that writs of habeas corpus frequently cost society the right to
punish admitted offenders. Passage of time ... may render retrial difficult, even impos-
sible." See supra Pt. I.B.3.a.
292. 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
293. Id.
294. One commentator, writing before Strickland was decided, concluded:
IT]he urgency of providing guidelines for determinations of ineffective assist-
ance will be enhanced as more and more habeas petitions are denied because of
the procedural defaults of marginally effective attorneys, consequently requiring
prisoners who are thereby precluded from asserting other constitutional claims
to allege incompetency of counsel, either as a means of satisfying the cause and
prejudice requirements in Sykes or as a separate sixth amendment claim.
Rosenberg, supra note 110, at 430 (footnotes omitted). Professor Rosenberg is arguing
that a narrow interpretation of cause and prejudice could induce habeas petitioners who
are barred from presenting other constitutional claims to move these claims into the
neighboring yard of ineffective assistance. This would create no new or additional litiga-
tion, but it might create strained judicial analyses of attorney incompetence if courts had
to resort to this formulation to aid defendants deprived of a fundamentally fair trial. This
is an argument for, not against, clarification of the standards governing cause, prejudice,
miscarriage of justice and incompetent counsel. See also Canary v. Bland, 583 F.2d 887,
890 (6th Cir. 1978) (unclear whether defense counsel's failure to challenge introduction
of a prior conviction constituted "cause" under Sykes; however, such failure constituted
sufficient "prejudice" to establish a sixth amendment violation); Strazzella, supra note
198, at 475 (use of ineffectiveness claims to neutralize possible forfeitures is likely to
increase).
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from Congress... as an amendment to the habeas provisions set out in 28
U.S.C. § 2254. At present, however, the vacuum in the habeas statute as
to defaulted claims296 has been filled by the judiciary. If the Court re-
tains its primary role in this area, it should establish a standard which is
neither ossified nor so protean that lower courts will founder in attempt-
ing to follow it. The elements of such a standard are explored below.
II. DEFINING PREJUDICE, CAUSE, AND MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
The Supreme Court has supplied the vocabulary for the cause and
prejudice standard, and has indicated the diverse purposes that this stan-
dard is designed to serve.297 Within that judicial framework, proposed
definitions of the key terms are set forth below, followed by an analysis of
the inclusions and exclusions.
295. Congress created the lower federal courts and has traditionally drawn the param-
eters of their jurisdiction. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1868); Sheldon
v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440, 448 (1850); see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 429
(1944). The legislature also has considerable authority to determine which forum, federal
or state, is most appropriate for the adjudication of federal issues. City of Greenwood v.
Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 833 (1966).
296. As previously noted, see supra Pt. I.B.3.c., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1982) provides
states with an opportunity to adjudicate constitutional challenges to state convictions.
Federal habeas applicants must exhaust whatever remedies are still available in the state
courts. Such exhaustion cannot take place in a Sykes situation, however, because defend-
ant has failed to follow state requirements; nevertheless he argues on habeas that he is
entitled to immediate federal resolution of his claims.
The Reagan Administration has proposed a number of changes in the present statutory
scheme. See generally, Yackle, supra note 145 for a discussion and critique of these bills.
The proposals would deny the writ in cases where there was a full and complete adjudica-
tion in state proceedings. Id. at 620-21. Similarly, factual determinations by the state
court would be presumed correct, with the applicant bearing the burden of rebuttal by
"clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 629.
The Administration also proposes its own cause and prejudice standard. If there has
been a failure to raise a claim in the state proceedings, actual prejudice must be coupled
with cause resulting from (1) state action in violation of the Constitution or United States
laws, (2) a novel federal right, or (3) facts not reasonably discoverable prior to the default.
Id. at 634-35.
297. See supra Pt. I.B.3.a. The Sykes requirements would be inappropriate where the
state procedural rule violated by the habeas applicant was irrational or invented to defeat
federal rights. See discussion of adequate state ground cases, supra note 73 and accompa-
nying text. In addition, lower courts have held that Sykes does not apply if the state
court itself reaches the merits of petitioner's claim. See Braxton v. Estelle, 641 F.2d 392,
394 (5th Cir. 1981); Gruttola v. Hammock, 639 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1981); Clark v.
Blackburn, 632 F.2d 531, 533 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647, 659
(N.D. Tex. 1977), affid, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); cf Irvin
v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 406 (1959) (federal habeas review available if petitioners obtained
decision on constitutional claim from highest state court even if decision could have been
based on other grounds). Sykes may also be inapplicable if the state itself forgives the
default. See Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1981); Quigg v. Crist,
616 F.2d 1107, 1111 n.4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 922 (1980); Zapata v. Estelle,
588 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1979). See infra note 307.
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A. Definition of Actual Prejudice:
IF A HABEAS CORPUS APPLICANT SEEKS RELIEF ON THE
BASIS OF A COGNIZABLE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM298
THAT HE OR HIS COUNSEL FAILED TO PRESENT AT
TRIAL,299 HE HAS THE BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING A
SUBSTANTIAL POSSIBILITY THAT BUT FOR THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL VIOLATION, THE RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN
DIFFERENT. A SUBSTANTIAL POSSIBILITY IS ONE WHICH
CLEARLY COULD HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME BUT
DID NOT NECESSARILY HAVE THIS EFFECT.
This definition is consonant with United States v. Frady's requirement
that the petitioner show "substantial disadvantage" because of an "error
of constitutional dimensions."" °  Moreover, it recognizes the relation-
ship established in Strickland v. Washington between the degree of final-
ity accorded to the judgment being challenged and the degree of
prejudice that the applicant must demonstrate.
As shown above,3°0 the Supreme Court has characterized the finality
of defendant's conviction as greater in Sykes than in Strickland chal-
lenges. Thus, the burden of proving prejudice in cases of procedural de-
fault is heavier than the one imposed when defendant claims that he has
been deprived of competent counsel, an indispensable component of a
fair trial.3 02 Under the proposed definition it must be clear that the error
could have changed the verdict.
On the other hand, the Sykes burden is lighter than in cases where the
fairness of the procedures used at the completed trial is not challenged.3"3
An outcome-determinative test has therefore been avoided: The appli-
cant need not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the verdict
was probably different because of the constitutional error. He must show
only that there is a substantial possibility of this result.304
298. If the underlying claim is not cognizable, there would be no reason to consider
whether the applicant's prior default should be binding. See L. Yackle, supra note 137,
§ 87, at 199 (Supp. 1984).
299. In accordance with the Sykes parameters, this Article examines only the appro-
priate standard to be applied when a default has occurred at trial. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
300. 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
301. See supra Part I.C.
302. See supra notes 255-56, 264-68 and accompanying text for an analysis of the
relationship between finality and prejudice requirements. The Eleventh Circuit's equa-
tion of Sykes prejudice with prejudice in sixth amendment cases, see Baker, Constitu-
tional Criminal Procedure, 34 Mercer L. Rev. 1241, 1269 (1983), has been superseded by
United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2048 (1984), and Strickland v. Washington, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).
303. Challenges based on newly discovered evidence are an example. See supra note
268 and accompanying text.
304. Thus, the defendant must persuade the district court judge that there is a serious
doubt that the outcome of the trial would have been the same absent the violation. As-
sume, for example, that defendant has been convicted of first degree murder for the
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1. The Relevance of Guilt and Innocence
How does the guilt/innocence calculus enter into this test? The preju-
dice requirement must be met in every case in which a prior procedural
default has occurred, but the habeas court's analysis may take the ques-
tion of innocence into account when deciding whether to grant the
writ.
30 5
Here a critical distinction between two basic kinds of innocence must
be made. Assume that our hypothetical defendant Nickel claims that he
was not given Miranda warnings before he confessed to murder, includ-
ing details concerning the crime which had never been publicly reported.
If a standard of legal guilt is used, the habeas court would consider the
confession only for the purpose of determining its effect on a verdict
which should have been based on untainted proof.3 6 If a standard of
factual guilt is used, however, the habeas court could consider all the
pertinent evidence. This would include not only the confession and the
other proof adduced or wrongfully excluded at trial, but any probative
evidence discovered after trial.30 7
Collateral review would be available under a legal guilt model if the
state's case were dependent upon the tainted proof.3 s Such review could
be denied under a factual guilt model, because the court could recognize
the probative value of the confession containing facts unknown to anyone
except the killer.
The distinction between these two models has not been explored in the
shooting of his brother. The defense argued at trial that the deceased had taken defend-
ant's gun out of a drawer and threatened to kill him. A struggle ensued, and the gun
accidentally discharged. The deceased's wife testified that the day before the shooting,
defendant had stated that he would kill his brother. Jury instructions given at the.trial
improperly placed the burden of proving self-defense on defendant. See supra note 216,
infra note 359. If the habeas judge would seriously consider the possibility that correct
jury instructions might have led to an acquittal, the applicant has satisfied the prejudice
requirement. This would be so even if the court ultimately concludes that defendant
would have been convicted regardless of the error.
305. See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
306. Goodman & Sallett, supra note 277, at 1700.
307. Under Judge Henry J. Friendly's formulation, the applicant for the writ must
show a "fair probability that, in light of all the evidence. . . the trier of the facts would
have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt." Friendly, supra note 218, at 160. Judge
Friendly eloquently argues that there are four areas where collateral attack may be "read-
ily justified irrespective of any question of innocence." Id. at 152. The first area is where
the criminal process is no longer operating, with the result that defendant is denied a
constitutionally guaranteed fair trial. Id. at 151. A second "is where a denial of constitu-
tional rights is claimed on the basis of facts which 'are dehors the record and their effect
on the judgment was not open to consideration and review on appeal.' "Id. at 152 (quot-
ing Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942)). Another area is "where the state
has failed to provide proper procedure for making a defense at trial and on appeal." Id.
Finally "[n]ew constitutional developments relating to criminal procedure are another
special case." Id. at 153.
308. When a habeas court reviews the merits of a petition, the state must demonstrate
that constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See infra notes 328,
335 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state's burden.
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Supreme Court's development of the cause and prejudice requirement.
The Sykes majority implicitly accepted a legal guilt approach in its hold-
ing that no prejudice had resulted from admitting defendant's inculpa-
tory statement in view of the substantiality of the other proof against
him.30 9 By contrast, Frady referred to the lack of "affirmative evidence"
of innocence,30 apparently utilizing a factual guilt standard. In Strick-
land, the Court searched for "a reasonable probability that, absent the
errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting
guilt," rejecting a factual guilt test without explicit reference to the
point.311
The definition of prejudice proposed in this Article is based on legal
guilt. This determination is consonant with the present congressional di-
rection in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which states that the federal court "shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. . . in violation of
the Constitution."31 2 The statute does not restrict the writ to those who
make a colorable showing of innocence. Rather, Congress focused on the
requirement of a constitutionally valid trial.
However, a particular concern for excluding the factually guilty from
habeas consideration emerged in the Supreme Court's historic Stone v.
Powell 31 3 ruling. Noting that no exceptions for particular categories of
constitutional claims had been made during the period of substantive ex-
pansion of the writ,3"' the Court proceeded to create one such exception.
It held that if a state "has provided an opportunity for full and fair litiga-
tion of a Fourth Amendment claim, [the Constitution does not require
that] a state prisoner. . be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the
ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure
was introduced at his trial. 315
309. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91. In Sykes, both Justices Brennan and Marshall interpreted
this reliance on the other evidence of guilt as a species of harmless error which excludes
the tainted proof in assessing the question of innocence. See id. at 117 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
310. 456 U.S. at 171.
311. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2069 (1984).
312. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). But see Judge Friendly's argument, supra note 218, at
154, that although § 2254 also provides for the writ in cases in which the defendant is
held in violation of a federal statute, collateral attack on statutory grounds has been
disfavored. Judge Friendly points out that collateral review is similarly disfavored "when
a constitutional claim has been rejected, allegedly in error, after thoroughly constitutional
proceedings." Friendly, supra note 218, at 154; see Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of
1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 31, 58 (1965) (analyzing
the history of the 1867 statute and concluding that it was not intended as a comprehen-
sive device for review of state court convictions).
313. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
314. See id. at 475-76 nn.7-8. The court pointed out that before 1889, appellate review
in federal criminal cases was rare. The writ was gradually expanded to encompass cases
involving fundamental rights essentially related to "unconstitutional statutes" and "ille-
gal sentence[s]." Id. at 476 n.8. See supra notes 50, 86.
315. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494. Stone's allusion to an opportunity for a full and fair hear-
ing was explained only by a footnote reference to Townsend v. San. See id. at 494 n.36.
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Justice Powell's opinion for the majority listed several guilt/innocence
issues among the costs of applying the exclusionary rule: Probative evi-
dence is not admitted, truth-finding is frustrated, the guilty may be
freed.3" 6 The rule is retained at trial and on direct appeal despite these
costs because of the "hope" that future unlawful seizures will be de-
terred.317 The rejection of the rule on collateral review stemmed from
the Court's conclusion that such deterrence would be increased only
marginally, if at all, by the possibility that a writ might issue years after
the defendant's conviction.3" 8 A footnote tendered an assurance that the
decision was "not concerned with the scope of the habeas corpus statute
as authority for litigating constitutional claims generally."3 9
Stone illustrates the Court's continuing ambivalence about the relation
Townsend required that the federal courts hold an evidentiary hearing if it appears that a
habeas petitioner did not receive a full and fair litigation "on the merits" in a state court.
372 U.S. 293, 314 (1963). Thus, Stone may be read to preclude habeas consideration of
fourth amendment claims only if such claims were actually addressed in state tribunals.
See O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1221 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977). Under this reading, a petitioner who never presented
his fourth amendment challenge to the state courts at all may be eligible for federal re-
view, because the Court's holding applies only to cases in which a prior state court litiga-
tion on the merits of the claim has occurred. But see Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830,
837-38 (2d Cir. 1977) (concluding that the footnoted reference to Townsend would not
require habeas consideration of an unlawful search and seizure challenge if "the state
prisoner, having an opportunity to do so, never tendered the question to the state court"),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978). See also the other post-Sykes decisions in Morrison v.
Kimmelman, 752 F.2d 918, 920 (3d Cir. 1985) (state provided "opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim") (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
494 (1975)); Maxey v. Morris, 591 F.2d 386, 388-91 (7th Cir.) (defendant who failed to
litigate his constitutional claim in state courts will not be entitled to habeas corpus re-
view), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 912 (1979); Johnson v. Meacham, 570 F.2d 918, 920 (10th
Cir. 1978) (failure to make timely objection in state court amounts to "independent ade-
quate state procedural ground" precluding habeas consideration). See supra note 321.
These cases should not be interpreted too broadly, however. Sykes, which was issued one
year after Stone, reaffirms the power of the federal district courts to grant relief as to a
defaulted claim if cause and prejudice are shown; preservation of this power is essential to
prevent miscarriage of justice. See supra note 29, infra notes 404-25 and accompanying
text.
Thus, even under the more restrictive approach suggested by the circuit courts, Stone's
preclusion of habeas applicants who have forfeited an opportunity for a full and fair
hearing applies only to those whose default is unexcused. See Johnson, 570 F.2d at 920;
cf. Maxey, 591 F.2d at 391 (habeas review available if default was "result of 'cause and
prejudice' "). Defendants who meet the Sykes test could therefore receive consideration
of fourth amendment claims on the merits.
316. Stone, 428 U.S. at 490. In an earlier decision, Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S.
217 (1969), the Court had held that "a claim of unconstitutional search and seizure is
cognizable in a [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 proceeding." Id. at 231. Justice Black dissented, stat-
ing that the "element of probable or possible innocence . . . should be given weight in
determining whether a judgment after conviction and appeal and affirmance should be
open to collateral attack, for the great historic role of the writ of habeas corpus has been
to insure reliability of the guilt-determining process." Id. at 234 (Black, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
317. Stone, 428 U.S. at 492.
318. Id. at 493.
319. Id. at 495 n.37 (emphasis in original).
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between the congressional scheme governing the writ and the question of
factual innocence.32' Nevertheless, the apprehension of the Stone dis-
senters that all claims which are not "guilt-related" would be withdrawn
from habeas corpus jurisdiction has not yet proved prophetic.32 1 Simi-
larly, our proposed definition of prejudice effects no such preclusion.
"Actual prejudice" could apply if a petitioner alleging factual inno-
cence makes the requisite showing as to the effect of a constitutional er-
ror, such as admission of a coerced confession constructed by state
officers.322 The standard could also be met in cases where an element in
320. See Seidman, supra note 110, at 449-59. See also Tague II, supra note 145, at 29-
34, arguing that limitation of habeas relief to the factually innocent would be consistent
with the Court's treatment of guilty plea cases, its emphasis on due process, and its stan-
dards for prospective application of new procedural rules. Professor Tague predicts that
adoption of a factual innocence approach for defining "actual prejudice" would eliminate
from habeas review not only Miranda cases, but also claims subsumed under Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), where the Court held that use of a stomach pump as
an involuntary device to obtain evidence violated due process because such behavior
"shocks the conscience." Tague II, supra note 145, at 32 & n.156; see Cover &
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035,
1077-1100 (1977). Stone's rationale was presaged by Justice Powell's concurrence in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), concluding that those proffering a col-
orable claim of innocence are the appropriate candidates for a writ of habeas corpus, see
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 265-66 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Friendly, supra note 218).
321. The dissenters expressed concern that Miranda violations, double jeopardy, en-
trapment and other issues would be precluded. Stone, 428 U.S. at 517-18 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). This concern was relieved, at least as to fourteenth amendment challenges,
by Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 560-61 (1979). In Mitchell, the habeas petition alleged
racial discrimination in the selection of members of a state grand jury. Id. at 549. The
Court pointed out that this fourteenth amendment claim differed fundamentally from the
fourth amendment questions raised in Stone. Id. at 560-61. The claims in Mitchell con-
cerned "allegations that the trial court itself violated the Fourteenth Amendment," in
contrast to fourth amendment cases involving police seizure of evidence. Id. at 561. Jus-
tice Blackmun stated that in the context of these violations "[flederal habeas review is
necessary to ensure that constitutional defects. . . are not overlooked by the very state
judges who operate that system." Id. at 563.
The impact of Stone on sixth amendment claims was explored in Morrison v. Kim-
melman, 752 F.2d 918, 921-22 (3d Cir. 1985). State trial counsel had conducted no dis-
covery and was therefore unaware that damaging evidence against defendant had been
unlawfully seized. Id. at 919. Counsel failed to make a timely motion to suppress the
evidence before trial, as required by state law. Id. Defendant's subsequent petition for
habeas corpus alleged that his attorney's negligence rose to the level of a sixth amend-
ment infringement. See id. Although the state had accorded petitioner a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment challenge, the Third Circuit remanded for a
determination of whether counsel's incompetence had prevented him from utilizing this
opportunity. See id. at 923. Stone would bar consideration of the fourth amendment
violation but not of the claim of ineffective assistance. Id. at 920-22. While Stone reflects
doubts about the efficacy of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has not doubted the
necessity of competent counsel. Id. at 921-22 (citing Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2063);
accord Sallie v. North Carolina, 587 F.2d 636, 640-41 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 911 (1979). But see LiPuma v. Commissioner, 560 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir.) (claim of
incompetence with regard to assertion of fourth amendment violation is barred under
Stone), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977).
322. In Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), a habeas applicant challeng-
ing a first degree murder conviction and death sentence alleged that he had confessed
because he was threatened by police officers, and that details of the confessions had been
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the truth-finding process was defective at trial. Thus, if the jury that
convicted the defendant was selected by an official who might possibly
have been sympathetic to the prosecution, prejudice could be established
even without a colorable showing of innocence.323 The constitutional er-
ror here would not involve the admission of tainted proof. Rather, the
error would stem from the use of a suspect method of arriving at a just
verdict. This claim would have a more attenuated relation to guilt or
innocence than the coerced confession challenge, but that relation would
still be discernible.
In addition, the prejudice test would be satisfied in a case where the
habeas applicant demonstrates a substantial possibility that a constitu-
tional error changed the verdict, even if that error was not guilt-related.
Would defendant Nickel's confession, containing some indicia of reliabil-
ity but given in the absence of a police recital of his constitutional rights,
meet this standard?
If an assumption that any confession is prejudicial per se is rejected,324
this question must be answered by conducting an empirical examination
of the prejudicial impact of Nickel's confession. The examination cannot
proceed in a vacuum. A conclusion about that impact will depend in
part upon the quality and quantity of the uncontaminated proof. It mat-
ters whether the rest of the prosecution's case consisted of several reliable
and independent eyewitnesses who testified that defendant shot the de-
ceased or, conversely, consisted merely of circumstantial evidence. 325
This empirical approach was used in Sykes, where the majority con-
suggested to him by these officers. Id. at 34. The court held that because defense counsel
had failed to object to the confession, petitioner had been deprived of effective representa-
tion under the sixth amendment. See id. at 39.
323. See, e.g., Thompson v. White, 661 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated, 456 U.S.
941, affid on rehearing per curiam, 680 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1177 (1983). In Thompson, a petitioner convicted of murder and sentenced to death for
the shooting of a law enforcement officer showed that a local sheriff had personally se-
lected all the potential jurors. The court held that although the sheriff was not the one
who had investigated the killing, the sympathy he might feel for a fellow officer made it
possible that the jurors that he selected could be biased in favor of the prosecution. Id. at
107. Actual prejudice under Sykes was found by the circuit court even though no identi-
fiable group was excluded from the jury panel. See id. at 105; see also Francis v. Hender-
son, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (showing of actual prejudice resulting from failure to
object to grand jury array required to overturn state court conviction).
324. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982), held that actual prejudice, not
merely the possibility of prejudice, must be shown by a petitioner with a defaulted claim.
See id. at 170; see also Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91 (finding no "actual prejudice"); Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (Supreme Court affirmed remand to explore ques-
tion of whether defendant was actually prejudiced by grand jury selection process);
Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 363 (1963) (when "objection to the jury
selection has not been timely raised under rule 12(b)(2), it is entirely proper to take ab-
sence of prejudice into account in determining whether a sufficient showing has been
made to warrant relief from the effect of that Rule"). See supra notes 248-49 and accom-
panying text. Thus, prejudice in Sykes cases will not be presumed; there may, however,
be circumstances in which the demonstration will be facilitated. See infra notes 418-24
and accompanying text.
325. But see Goodman & Sallett, supra note 277, at 1702-04 (apparently concluding
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eluded that "[t]he other evidence of guilt ... was substantial to a degree
that would negate any possibility of actual prejudice." '326 Note, however,
that such an analysis of the record does not transform our proposed defi-
nition into a factual guilt standard; the confession is considered for its
impermissible influence on the verdict rather than for indications that
defendant committed the crime.
2. The Relevance of Harmless Error
Does the prejudice inquiry, which assesses the gravity of the constitu-
tional error and the strength of the uncontaminated portions of the
state's case, "bear a strong resemblance to harmless-error doctrine," as
charged by the Sykes dissent?327 If so, should the contours of this doc-
trine guide the lower courts in defining prejudice? Traditionally, harm-
less error comes into play in the federal habeas corpus context after a
petition has been accepted for consideration on the merits. Even if the
petitioner demonstrates that a constitutional violation has occurred, the
writ may be dismissed if the state can prove that the violation was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt.328
An initial difficulty in answering the questions raised above is that
harmless error is not one doctrine but many. Three distinct approaches
have emerged: a stress on the constitutional error to see whether it might
have contributed to the verdict; a determination of whether the improp-
erly admitted evidence was merely cumulative; and consideration of
whether overwhelming untainted proof supported the conviction.329
The first of these was an earlier formulation than the others, and was
reiterated in cases riddled with internal contradictions.330 Moreover, the
that the weight of the untainted proof is not relevant in assessing the impr.ct of a constitu-
tional error).
326. 433 U.S. at 91.
327. See id. at 117 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 97-98 (White, J., concurring)
(coming to a similar conclusion); United States ex rel. Knights v. Wolff, 713 F.2d 240,
243 (7th Cir.) (the "error, if any. . . is harmless"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 504 (1983);
United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d 354, 361 (7th Cir. 1983) ("the error, if
any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"); United States v. Underwood, 440 F.
Supp. 499, 503-04 (1D.11I. 1977) ("[b]ecause the prejudice is harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt, the Court will not grant relief"); Goodman & Sallett, supra note 277,
at 1703-04 (contrasting cases applying a harmless error analysis with those that do not);
Appellate Forfeitures, supra note 15, at 870 n.104 (collecting sources).
328. L. Yackle, supra note 137, § 94, at 365. See, for example, Milton v. Wainwright,
407 U.S. 371 (1972), in which petitioner brought a federal district court challenge to his
state conviction of first degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief by
the lower courts, holding that if there had been trial error in admitting a confession it
was nonetheless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 377-78.
329. See State v. McKenzie, 186 Mont. 481, 533, 608 P.2d 428, 458 (1980); Field,
Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a Ra-
tionale, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15, 16 (1976).
330. A focus on the nature of the violation was stressed in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375
U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963). There the Court rejected a prior rule which appeared to mandate
automatic reversal of convictions involving constitutional errors. See id. at 86. See gen-
erally Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. Rev. 988, 999-1002 (1973)
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Supreme Court has recently underscored the defects of a test that would
allow nullification of a conviction if an error "had some conceivable ef-
fect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of
counsel would meet that test . . . and not every error that conceivably
could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the re-
sult of the proceeding." '331 The last of these harmless error approaches-
the overwhelming evidence standard-focuses on the weight of the un-
tainted proof.332 The Court has continued to utilize this standard, which
(special treatment for constitutional violations). Fahy stated: "We are not concerned
here with whether there was sufficient evidence on which the petitioner could have been
convicted without the evidence complained of. The question is whether there is a reason-
able possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the convic-
tion." 375 U.S. at 86-87. While this standard refers to a possibility that a certain result
occurred, note the kind of result that is described: "the evidence. . . contributed to the
conviction." Id.
The stringent Fahy approach was reconsidered in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
22-23 (1967), where the Court acknowledged that some constitutional errors might be too
insignificant to warrant reversal of a conviction, although reversal would be called for
where "highly important and persuasive evidence. . . finds its way into a trial in which
the question of guilt or innocence is a close one." Id. at 22. However, this modification
of Fahy appears to be neutralized when the Chapman majority again repeats that "error
in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury . . . cannot,
under Fahy, be conceived of as harmless." Id. at 23-24.
A more definitive modification of Fahy was adopted in Harrington v. California, 395
U.S. 250, 253-54 (1969), which involved the admission of confessions by co-defendants,
only one of whom took the stand and was cross-examined. The Court asserted that no
dilution of Chapman was intended, but went on to hold:
[The confessions of co-defendants] . . . did place [Harrington] at the scene of
the crime. But others, including Harrington himself, did the same. Their [con-
fessions were] cumulative. But apart from them the case against Harrington
was so overwhelming that we conclude that this violation of Bruton was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt ....
id. at 253-54.
To what extent can these standards be reconciled? The "cumulative evidence" test,
which may be viewed as separate from the other renditions of harmless error, see State v.
McKenzie, 186 Mont. 481, 533, 608 P.2d 428, 458 (1980); Field, supra note 329, at 16,
has not been extensively developed by the Supreme Court. Some commentators have con-
cluded that the "overwhelming evidence" and "contribution to the verdict" approaches
would produce similar holdings, because the presence of untainted and overwhelming
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would lead the reviewing court to determine
that the error made no significant contribution to the conviction. See Goodman & Sal-
lett, supra note 277, at 1699-1703; Saltzburg, supra note 330, at 1014 n.89. Nevertheless,
a blending of the various harmless error holdings would be anomalous if Chapman re-
mains viable and is read as mandating that a constitutional error "made no contribution
to a criminal conviction." Harrington, 395 U.S. at 255 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis in original). Chapman is susceptible of several different readings, however. The ma-
jority concluded inter alia that "absent the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest,
fair-minded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts," Chapman, 386
U.S. at 25-26, inferring that the error could have tipped the scales in favor of conviction.
331. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067-68 (1984) (citations omitted). The context in
Strickland was a discussion not of the harmless error doctrine but of the appropriate
prejudice burden when a sixth amendment claim of incompetent counsel is made.
332. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1969). As the dissenting Harring-
ton Justices noted, the Chapman rule had focused instead upon the impact of the consti-
tutional violation. See id. at 255 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., and Burger, C.J.,
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is met if the verdict would beyond a reasonable doubt have been the same
even without the violation.333
We therefore address the overwhelming evidence formulation in an-
swering the question of whether the Sykes prejudice requirement resem-
bles the harmless error doctrine. A threshold distinction between the
two is that under the prejudice requirement, it is the habeas applicant
who has the burden of proof;334 the state bears that burden when harm-
less error is alleged. 335 This is not merely a role reversal; the habeas
petitioner need not prove that the constitutional error was harmful be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
Indeed, under the prejudice definition suggested in this Article, the
applicant need not marshal a preponderance of the evidence in favor of
the probability that the error tipped the scales against him. His task ex-
tends no further than demonstrating a substantial possibility of such a
result.336 This test is satisfied if a federal habeas judge entertains a seri-
ous doubt that there would have been a conviction absent the error, even
if he ultimately determines that the verdict would have been the same.
By contrast, a reverse version of harmless error would require a demon-
stration that an outcome-determinative impact had actually occurred.337
The principal similarity between harmless error analysis and our pro-
posed prejudice approach is that both are premised on a legal rather than
a factual guilt model.338 Beyond this common point, such analysis is of
dissenting). The two inquiries are obviously connected, however. Indeed, the dissenters
urged that the lower courts concentrate on "the character. . . of the tainted evidence as
it relates to the untainted evidence." Id at 256.
333. See, eg., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1972). Yet the Court often
incorporates harmless error language to reject constitutional challenges to state convic-
tions, see, e.g., Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430-32 (1972), without expressly en-
throning a particular formulation of the doctrine. Justice Marshall concluded in Briggs
v. Connecticut, 447 U.S. 912 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari),
that state courts have the power to "select" a standard, but criticized the choice of the
overwhelming evidence formulation as unsuitable in a case in which unconstitutional jury
instructions were given. Id. at 914-15.
334. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
335. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
336. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
337. Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. at 2067-68 (analogous rejection of an
outcome-determinative test as to claims of prejudice by a petitioner alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment).
338. See supra text accompanying notes 332-33, 312. The Sykes dissent had urged that
if the prejudice analysis resembled the inquiry conducted in response to harmless error
claims, federal courts might as well dispense with the Sykes pre-screening and proceed to
dispose of habeas petitioners' challenges on the merits. 433 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). While it is true that in both situations the courts would be examining the
constitutional error in the light of the rest of the record, burden of proof differences could
lead to different results. A defendant whose claim was not presented in state court would
prevail in the pre-screening only if he showed not only an error of constitutional dimen-
sion, Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979); Payne v. Smith, 667 F.2d 541, 544
n.2 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932 (1982), but also cause for the default and a
substantial possibility that the error changed the verdict. Once a merits review stage is
reached, however, the habeas applicant's principal task is to meet the requirement of
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little assistance in defining prejudice. Harmless error explores the rela-
tion between the seriousness of the constitutional violation at issue and
the strength of the state's uncontaminated proof largely on a case-by-case
basis, and in the context of searching for errors of "reversible
weight" 339-those which would cause a juror who would have voted for
the defense to vote instead for the prosecution. Thus, no transferable
principles emerge to give guidance to the prejudice inquiry.
B. Definition of Cause:
ALTHOUGH A DEFAULT SHOULD NOT BE EXCUSED
SOLELY BECAUSE COUNSEL ACTED PURSUANT TO A
POORLY CONCEIVED STRATEGY OR INADVERTENTLY
NEGLECTED TO PRESENT A CLAIM, CAUSE MAY BE
FOUND IF A COGNIZABLE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
PROFFERED IN A HABEAS PETITION
(1) IS BASED ON AN INTERPRETATION OF THE CON-
STITUTION WHICH WAS TOO NOVEL AT THE TIME OF
TRIAL FOR A REASONABLE ATTORNEY TO HAVE AN-
TICIPATED IT, OR ON FACTS WHICH WOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED AT THE TIME OF TRIAL BY
REASONABLE INVESTIGATION, OR
(2) WAS NOT PRESENTED AT TRIAL BECAUSE THE
CONSEQUENCES WOULD HAVE BEEN SO PUNITIVE
THAT A REASONABLE ATTORNEY WOULD NOT HAVE
PURSUED IT, OR
(3) WAS NOT PRESENTED AT TRIAL BY INADVER-
TENCE, AND IN ADDITION THE APPLICANT MEETS
THE PREJUDICE REQUIREMENT BY A SHOWING INDI-
CATING FACTUAL INNOCENCE OR A DEFECT IN THE
TRUTH-FINDING PROCESS. 3
40
The substitution of the "cause and prejudice" formulation for Noia's
"deliberate bypass" approach has been analyzed extensively in Part 1.341
The underlying purposes of the change bear a critical relation to the
cause definition proposed above, and therefore must be briefly
reexamined.
The Sykes majority described the decision in Noia as encouraging
sandbagging.342 This criticism is puzzling if one assumes that a standard
demonstrating constitutional error. He could prevail on the merits if the state failed to
show that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in a close case
the merits review might well be more intensive than the pre-merits inquiry because of the
increased demands of an outcome-determinative standard.
339. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
340. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text. This definition presumes that the
defaulted claims could have been presented at trial under available and valid procedures.
See supra note 297, infra note 386.
341. See supra Pts. I.A., B.3.
342. See 433 U.S. at 89.
[Vol. 53
HABEAS CORPUS AFTER STATE DEFA ULT
penalizing defendants for strategic decisions to circumvent a state rule" 3
is a sufficient deterrent against any conscious choice to withhold a viable
claim during a state prosecution. But, for two reasons, this was not the
Supreme Court's assumption.
First, Noia had incorporated a client-consultation requirement that
suspended the deliberate bypass penalty for actions taken by counsel
alone. ' " Because such consultations are often impracticable in the
course of trial, the bypass restriction failed to screen out purposeful at-
torney behavior.345 Second, identification of such behavior became a
guessing game even for the Justices themselves, as their disagreement
over the motives of John Sykes' counsel illustrates.3 46
Cause should therefore be defined so as to enhance particular results
rather than adopt particular labels. Some deliberate choices should be
acknowledged as proper "cause" candidates. Some inadvertent errors
should not.347 Sykes and its progeny indicate which results are to be
effectuated.
In its treatment of the cause requirement, the Court lingered over the
enhanced trial efficiency resulting from better lawyering, deterrence of
attorney misfeasance, and respect for the finality of state convictions." s
Nevertheless, competing values also emerged and received repeated em-
phasis: concern with protecting a defendant who is unjustly incarcerated
and preventing a miscarriage of justice. 49 The cause definition proposed
in this Article takes into account these competing considerations.
1. Novelty
a. The Legal Basis for the Claim
An attorney at a criminal trial fails to raise objections to jury instruc-
tions on self-defense. After conviction and exhaustion of the direct ap-
peal process, the Supreme Court renders a decision in an unrelated case
declaring such jury instructions to be defective on constitutional
343. Also evaded in this end run is the congressional mandate that state remedies be
exhausted prior to applying for habeas corpus relief. See supra Pt. I.B.3.c.
344. See 372 U.S. at 439. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
345. See supra Pt. I.B.3.b.
346. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. An attorney who wishes to pro-
tect his professional reputation and foreclose potential malpractice suits may label his
own inaction as strategic. See Goodman & Sallett, supra note 277, at 1720. See supra
note 164, infra note 416. Conversely, an attorney who wishes to help his client may pur-
posely mislabel a strategic decision as inadvertent. De novo fact-finding in the federal
district court may thus be necessary in Sykes cases. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231, 234 n.1 (1980). If there is no testimony, the written record will be the only basis for
the court's assessment of the attorney's motivation. Goodman & Sallett, supra note 277,
at 1720-21.
347. See infra Pt. II.B.3.
348. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-90. See supra Pts. I.B.3.a., B.4.
349. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 163, 172; Isaac, 456 U.S. at 135; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91. See
supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between
innocence and prejudice. See also infra Pt. II.C. for a discussion of miscarriage ofjustice.
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grounds. Under what circumstances should the novelty of the legal
claim constitute cause for the failure to object at trial?
As Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority in Engle v. Isaac
stated, it has long been held that "later discovery of a constitutional de-
fect unknown at the time of trial does not invariably render the original
trial fundamentally unfair."350 The word "unknown" might be read as
referring merely to the trial attorney's unfamiliarity with a developing
line of lower court cases concerning the constitutional violation at issue.
However, a footnote reference indicates that this term was intended also
to include instances when there was no judicial basis for claiming the
right during the course of the prosecution.35 '
Thus, not every new constitutional right is declared retroactive and
relevant to habeas corpus petitions involving prosecutions that have al-
ready taken place.352 Should one which has been held retroactive be
available on habeas even though the applicant failed to invoke it at trial?
In answering this question, the Isaac majority had several options. It
could have found the Sykes requirements inapplicable and permitted a
merits review as to any retroactive right proffered in a habeas petition.
Conversely, it could have held that unless the defendant was prescient
enough to raise the constitutional objection, the default would be bind-
ing.353 The Court did neither, adopting instead an approach requiring an
individualized analysis as to the novelty of the right at stake.35 4
In avoiding the first option, the majority decreased the number of peti-
tions which would otherwise have been eligible for federal district court
review. In avoiding the second, the majority decreased the number of
insubstantial arguments which might otherwise have been proffered in
state trial and appellate courts.355 In adopting the third approach, the
350. 456 U.S. at 131.
351. Id. at 131 n.38. The footnote attached to the quoted statement, see supra text
accompanying note 350, refers to Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971), which examined at length the justification
for refusing to make certain categories of new constitutional rights apply retroactively on
collateral review. While acknowledging that uniform retroactivity would promote a
"rough form of justice" and similarity of treatment among prisoners, Justice Harlan con-
cluded that this consideration was outweighed by the state's interest in finality with re-
spect to convictions that were free from error at the time they occurred. See id. at 689-
91. Indeed, a second prosecution on "stale facts" might produce a result which is no
more reliable than the first trial. Id. at 691 (Harlan, J., concurring).
352. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 & n.43 (1982).
353. While the Court did not foreclose the possibility of such a holding in a future
case, it expressed hesitation as to adopting a rule which would require clairvoyance or
objection to every aspect of a proceeding in the hope of touching upon an inchoate claim.
See id. at 131. The subsequent decision in Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984), defini-
tively held that novelty could constitute cause under the proper circumstances. Id. at
2910. See infra notes 359-67, 370-74 and accompanying text.
354. See Isaac, 456 U.S. at 133-34.
355. Justice Brennan stated that if novelty never constituted cause "we might actually
disrupt state-court proceedings by encouraging defense counsel to include any and all
remotely plausible constitutional claims that could, some day, gain recognition." Reed v.
Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2910 (1984).
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Court increased the complexity of the inquiry that the habeas court must
make when a defaulted claim was inchoate at the time of trial.
The Isaac respondents invoked rights which had been declared retro-
active in Hankerson v. North Carolina.356 However, Hankerson itself had
indicated in a footnote that the states may have the power to insulate
past convictions by enforcing valid waiver rules.357 Rather than taking
the Hankerson footnote as preclusive, the Isaac majority looked to
whether respondents had "lacked the tools to construct their constitu-
tional claim" while the prosecution was occurring. 358
A number of questions arise from this test. Must counsel have per-
sonal knowledge of the decisions which would constitute "tools," or is
constructive knowledge to be imputed to him under some circumstances?
How many such decisions would suffice, and from which judicial level
must they emanate?
The next foray into the meaning of cause, Reed v. Ross,3 59 suggested
answers to these questions. Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority
reviewed three ways in which a new constitutional requirement can be
established by the Supreme Court: a prior precedent might be explicitly
overruled, a widespread practice expressly approved by virtually all
lower courts could be overturned, or a practice which has arguably been
permitted in prior Supreme Court cases may be disapproved.3 6°
A retroactive decision falling into one of the first two categories would
by definition provide no foundation for a prior state court objection and
356. 432 U.S. 233, 243 (1977). Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), held that
"the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented
in a homicide case." IL at 704. Hankerson in turn gave Mullaney "complete retroactive
effect." Hankerson, 432 U.S. at 240-41 (quoting Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S.
203, 204-05 (1972)).
357. 432 U.S. at 244 n.8 ("The States, if they wish, may be able to insulate past convic-
tions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a
waiver of any claim of error.").
358. 456 U.S. at 133.
359. 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984). Respondent Daniel Ross was convicted in North Caro-
lina of first degree murder for the shooting death of his wife. The victim's brother testified
that Ross fired a number of shots, went outside and reloaded his gun, and then returned
and fired what was possibly the fatal shot. The prosecutor's witness further testified that
the victim did not have a weapon and that Daniel Ross did not appear to be injured.
Respondent testified that his wife stabbed him in the back of the neck with a knife and
that he responded by shooting her. His sister corroborated this statement, testifying that
her brother was bleeding from a neck wound. State v. Ross, 275 N.C. 550, 551-52, 169
S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 1050 (1970). At trial, jury instructions
placed the burden of proving lack of malice and self-defense on the defendant. Ross, 104
S. Ct. at 2905. Ross' challenge to his conviction in the federal courts cited the subsequent
decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), which held that requiring defend-
ant to bear the burden of proving lack of malice was a violation of due process. Ross, 104
S. Ct. at 2906-07. See supra note 356. The Court in Ross held that the "claim was suffi-
ciently novel in 1969 to excuse his attorney's failure to raise the Mullaney issue." Ross,
104 S. Ct. at 2912.
360. See Ross, 104 S. Ct. at 2911.
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therefore cause could be found for such a default. Cases falling into the
last category, however, would have to be more closely examined.361 Cri-
teria for such an examination were supplied:
Whether an attorney had a reasonable basis for pressing a claim chal-
lenging a practice that this Court has arguably sanctioned depends on
how direct this Court's sanction of the prevailing practice had been,
how well entrenched the practice was in the relevant jurisdiction at the
time of defense counsel's failure to challenge it, and how strong the
available support is from sources opposing the prevailing practice.
362
Note the majority's use of the phrase "reasonable basis," which paral-
lels an earlier reference to failure to raise a "reasonably unknown" con-
stitutional issue.363 The standard of reasonableness is objective, looking
to what counsel should have recognized rather than what he did recog-
nize. Thus, constructive knowledge rather than proof of personal knowl-
edge becomes the relevant touchstone.3 4
Is the state of the art in counsel's jurisdiction the appropriate context?
Should he be judged only against what other lawyers in his locality
knew? One lower court has answered these questions affirmatively:
Cause has been found where a constitutionally objectionable practice was
customary and was presumed valid by the prosecutor, court, and defend-
ant's attorney.365
The Ross criteria focus to some extent on counsel's own locality. At-
tention is directed to the "jurisdiction" in which the violation occurred,
and how entrenched the offending practice was at the time when counsel
failed to challenge it. On the other hand, the majority's reference to as-
sessment of the "available support" for objecting to the unconstitutional
practice could be interpreted as referring to relevant precedents in any
locality. Indeed, decisions from a federal and a state court outside of the
jurisdiction where Ross was prosecuted were considered as possible au-
thority for a contemporaneous objection. 366 These cases were ultimately
found insufficient because they were not directly on point rather than
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 2909.
364. But see Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 829 (1 1th Cir.) (pre-Reed decision hold-
ing that personal knowledge must be shown in order to bar a finding of cause), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 201 (1983).
365. See Bromwell v. Williams, 445 F. Supp. 106, 114 (D. Md. 1977). Because of lack
of courtroom space, it had been customary to argue consolidation motions within the
hearing of the petit jury panel. Defendant was charged with assault and battery and a
handgun violation. While the voir dire panel was in the courtroom before the jury was
selected, the prosecution moved to consolidate the case with another charging the defend-
ant with breaking and entering and larceny. The motion was denied. No objection was
made to the holding of the discussion in front of the jury that was to determine guilt on
the assault and handgun violations. Defendant was convicted and subsequently argued
on federal habeas corpus that his right to a fair and impartial jury had been infringed.
The Sykes cause requirement was found satisfied because none of the trial participants
"conceived that any error was being committed." Id.
366. See Ross, 104 S. Ct. at 2912.
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because they were extraterritorial. 67
The question of whether a reasonable attorney would have challenged
the objectionable practice cannot be resolved simply by pointing to a
dearth of such challenges in his home state at the time of prosecution.
Reasonable preparation should include not only knowledge of Supreme
Court precedents, but also of federal circuit court holdings and decisions
by the highest court of a state,3 68 assuming sufficient time has elapsed for
their publication in advance sheets.
How many cases must be aggregated in order to constitute an effective
tool? Both Isaac and Ross concerned allegations that jury instructions on
burden of proof were unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor's Isaac opinion
concluded that the Court's prior decision in In re Winship constituted an
available foundation for a burden of proof challenge, particularly since
other defendants had so utilized it.369 The Ross majority, in discussing
and distinguishing Isaac, agreed that "numerous courts" had provided
further authority which Isaac's counsel could have cited at trial.37°
In Ross, however, defendant's trial took place before Winship, and the
majority found that there was only "indirect" support available for the
claim at issue.371 The dissent disputed this conclusion, arguing that Win-
ship's treatment of burden of proof requirements as to adults372 was "set-
tled by a long line of earlier decisions, 3 73 and that "the legal basis on
which Winship rested was perceived earlier by other courts" whose deci-
sions provided more than indirect guides for Ross and his attorney. 4
Thus, neither the majority nor the dissent would accept two or three
isolated cases as an "available tool." Both factions stressed the need for
several clear precedents, although they disagreed on whether such prece-
dents existed in Ross. The number of decisions that would trigger the
reasonable attorney's contemporaneous objection should also depend on
the tribunal from which such cases emanate. If a Supreme Court deci-
sion such as Winship is available for interpretation and application, fewer
auxiliary cases should be required.
367. See id. at 2912.
368. Many such cases are reported in the Criminal Law Reporter published by the
Bureau of National Affairs. See generally Crim. L. Rep. (BNA). Federal district court
cases and intermediate level state court decisions outside counsel's jurisdiction have not
been included in our interpretation of the appropriate standard; such detailed knowledge
would be laudable but difficult to maintain without access to computer aids.
369. See 456 U.S. at 131-32 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
370. See Ross, 104 S. Ct. at 2912 (quoting Isaac, 456 U.S. at 132).
371. Id.
372. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion concluded that Wlinship's "novel" holding
was that prior burden of proof requirements would also apply to juveniles. See id. at 2914
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
373. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that these decisions ranged from
Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1881), to Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121
(1954).
374. Ross, 104 S. Ct. at 2915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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b. The Factual Basis for the Claim
What if the cause showing made by a habeas applicant is based on
facts which trial counsel did not know, rather than on legal theories
which counsel failed to apply? The definition proposed in this Article
calls for reasonable inquiry-the touchstone is whether a prudent attor-
ney would have discovered the critical facts and made a timely proffer in
the state court.
If one purpose of Sykes is to deter counsel's carelessness, it is particu-
larly appropriate to require a high threshold for cause relating to the
failure to uncover relevant facts. There may be valid reasons for hesitat-
ing to encourage trial proffers of novel but tenuous legal theories;37- by
contrast, encouragement of thorough factual investigation prior to trial is
of undoubted value. As noted by the American Bar Association, it is the
duty of counsel
to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and
to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits . . and
the penalty in the event of conviction. The investigation should always
include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecu-
tion and law enforcement authorities. 376
These standards have been cited by the Supreme Court as suitable
"guides to determining what is reasonable."'371 Justice O'Connor's
Strickland opinion, which concerns sixth amendment incompetence
claims, 378 succinctly described the kind of preparation that is expected of
an attorney: "[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or
to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary. 37
9
In assessing such decisions, however, hindsight should not be permit-
ted to provide too much illumination. The number, complexity and s(ra-
tegic implications of the potential defenses must be evaluated from the
perspective in which they appeared to counsel at the time of trial. The
375. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
376. See 1 American Bar Ass'n, Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, 4.53 (2d ed.
1980) ("The Defense Function").
377. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984).
378. See id. at 2063-64. For discussion of such claims, see supra Pt. I.C.
379. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; see Thompson v. White, 661 F.2d 103, 105-06 (8th
Cir. 1981), vacated, 456 U.S. 941 (1982), af'd on rehearing per curiam, 680 F.2d 1173
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1177 (1983), discussed infra note 380. Violations of this
duty are illustrated by Johns v. Perini, 462 F.2d 1308, 1313-14 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1049 (1972), and Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 38 (9th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963), both involving ineffective assistance claims. In Johns, coun-
sel made virtually no effort to investigate the alibi that was his client's chief defense or to
secure available exculpatory records. See 462 F.2d at 13 10-11. In Brubaker, counsel in a
capital case was told that his client's confession was coerced, but he did not obtain a copy
of the initial recorded interrogation nor did he contact obvious witnesses. See 310 F.2d at
35, 38. But see supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impor-
tance of adequate funding for public defender offices and court-appointed lawyers as a
means of reducing caseloads and permitting more preparation time.
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cause requirement is satisfied if an inquiry seemed to be unnecessary
then, even if later events prove that such an inquiry would have un-
earthed a significant fact. 8 The cause requirement is also met if govern-
mental misconduct has obscured counsel's opportunity to discover
favorable proof. In Freeman v. Georgia,381 for example, a city homicide
detective concealed the location of a woman who might have given evi-
dence helpful to the defense, and later married her.3 82 The circuit court
noted: "When a police statement misleads the defense into believing that
evidence will not be favorable, the state cannot thereafter argue that it
was a waiver not to request it."
383
Thus, an attorney who failed to proffer a constitutional claim at trial
because he was unaware of its factual basis must demonstrate either that
the information was unavailable at the time, or that reasonable inquiry
would not have uncovered it, or that in the light of all the potential de-
fenses and all the information received from the state, a reasonable deci-
sion not to investigate was made.
2. Default Arising Out of "Grisly" Alternatives
Generally, a tactical decision to withhold a constitutional claim in a
state court should not lead to a merits review in a federal court. Thus,
where an attorney withdrew a request for instructions on a lesser in-
cluded offense so that the jury would have to choose between convicting
the defendant of murder or acquitting him, the client was bound by the
default even though the gamble failed. 38 a Nor should a belief that an
objection would be futile constitute cause, regardless of whether that per-
380. See Thompson v. White, 661 F.2d 103, 105-06 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated, 456 U.S.
941 (1982), afl'd on rehearing per curiam, 680 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1177 (1983), where defense counsel failed to investigate the means by which jurors were
selected in defendant's trial for the murder of a police officer. On appeal it was shown
that investigation into the selection process would have revealed that the sheriff selected
the entire jury. The court held that the cause prong of the Sykes requirement was satis-
fied. Id. at 105-06.
381. 599 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
382. Id. at 68.
383. Id. at 72; accord Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1001 (1980).
384. See Ringstaff v. Mintzes, 539 F. Supp. 1124, 1129-30 (E.D. Mich. 1982) ('It is
apparent that the petitioners gambled that by having the jury consider only the alterna-
tives of a conviction for first degree murder or acquittal, the latter would be chosen.
Petitioners complain of error now that their calculated gamble has failed."). See also
United States ex rel. Edwards v. Warden, 676 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1982), where counsel
failed to object to the prosecution's opening statements which alluded to defendant's
post-arrest acts on behalf of the government. Id. at 257. Defendant filed a habeas claim,
arguing that these statements violated his rights against self-incrimination and to due
process under the fifth amendment. The writ was denied because the court found that
trial counsel was pursuing a deliberate strategy of portraying defendant's "unsuccessful
efforts to cooperate with the government as a conscientious effort to assist in the appre-
hension of a suspected narcotics trafficker." Id. The Seventh Circuit found that the fail-
ure to object had a reasonable tactical basis. See id. Similarly, in Graham v. Mabry, 645
F.2d 603 (8th Cir. 1981), the court found that defense counsel's failure to object to a
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ception is correct.385 In these situations, time may be lost but the claim
should nonetheless be proffered at trial or forfeited.386
Yet there may be extraordinary occasions when the making of a legiti-
mate objection would generate such hostility that the trier of the facts
might turn against the defendant. For example, in Whitus v. Balkcom 387
there was a historical foundation for counsel's concern that challenging
the racial composition of an all-white petit jury would irretrievably dam-
age defendant's chances for acquittal. The circuit court added: "When a
defendant's attorney prefers a particular jury, there is 'a voluntary choice
between two meaningful alternatives.' Absent this preference, there is no
voluntary choice to relinquish the right to a fairly constituted jury when
the right must be relinquished in order not to imperil the defense. "388
Another instance of such "grisly" alternatives, in a post-trial context,
was Noia itself. Defendant was faced with giving up his appeal on a via-
ble constitutional claim after being sentenced to life imprisonment or
risking a death sentence if he were convicted on retrial.
3 89
In Moreno v. Beto,390 counsel refrained from challenging admission of
an allegedly coerced confession because to do so would have required
juror's possible bias amounted to a trial tactic. Counsel merely had stronger reasons to
exclude other jurors. Id. at 607.
385. See Engle v. Isaac's refusal to countenance futility arguments, discussed supra at
note 221 and accompanying text. See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), where
the Court pointed out that if the underlying perception was that the judge would overrule
any objections to defendant wearing prison clothes at trial, such a perception was errone-
ous. The state judge had a policy of allowing defendants to wear civilian clothes on
request. Id. at 510-11.
386. A closer case may be made where fear of irritating the trial judge appears to have
been counsel's motive. See Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 703 (5th Cir. 1965) ("[Hie
who often objects, only to have his objections over-ruled, risks alienating the jury even if
he does not test the patience of the presiding judge."). While avoidance of such conflit
may be a tactical consideration for defense counsel, R. Givens, Advocacy, The Art of
Pleading a Cause 113-16 (Supp. 1984); see Tague I, supra note 113, at 131, it should not
ordinarily constitute cause. If a challenged violation was so significant that it would
merit the issuance of collateral relief, concern about being scolded by the judge must
become secondary. However, entirely arbitrary foreclosure of objections by such a trial
judge might be the basis for an argument in the federal district court that an opportunity
to articulate the constitutional challenge was not actually available. While exhaustion of
state remedies requires that a habeas petitioner "fairly presen[t]" the substance of his
claim to the state courts, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (quoting Picard v.
Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)), a conscientious effort to do so should be sufficient to
preclude a finding of a Sykes forfeiture. See also infra notes 387, 388 and accompanying
text (concluding that under rare circumstances objecting could be so prejudicial to de-
fendant that deliberate silence should not be penalized under the cause requirement).
387. 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
388. Id. at 502 (quoting Comment, Negro Defendants and Southern Lawyers: Review
in Federal Habeas Corpus of Systematic Exclusion of Negroes From Juries, 72 Yale L.J.
554, 567 (1963)) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
389. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440 (1963). A similar concern motivated defendant in
Thompson v. White, 661 F.2d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated, 456 U.S. 941 (1982),
aff'd on rehearing per curiam, 680 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1177
(1983).
390. 415 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1969).
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putting defendant on the stand and exposing him to cross-examination
on all aspects of the case in front of the jury,39' a requirement not known
at the time to be unconstitutional.392
The common thread in these intentional failures to pursue constitu-
tional objections is that counsel found himself between the hazard of
forfeiting the defense and the danger of forfeiting subsequent habeas con-
sideration. The cause definition proposed in this Article is satisfied if
assertion of a right would result in consequences that are so punitive that
a reasonable attorney would feel compelled to avoid them.
3. Inadvertence as Cause If Petitioner Meets the Prejudice
Requirement With a Showing of Factual Innocence or a
Defect in the Truth-Finding Process
If inadvertence automatically constituted cause, the Sykes standard
would differ from that of Noia only on the rather tenuous grounds ex-
plored in Part 1.133 Aside from this anomaly, the practical effect of such
an interpretation would be to reduce cause to a nominal requirement 394
and to interfere with the congressional intent evidenced by the mandate
that state remedies be exhausted before habeas relief is granted.395 More-
over, distinguishing between defaults which are tactical and those which
are not may involve a difficult balance of inferences.396
The strongest point in favor of such a reading of "cause"-avoiding a
client penalty for a lawyer's mistake--could also be invoked on behalf of
a client whose counsel made strategic errors.3 97 In both situations, the
defendant has been convicted and now proffers a constitutional claim
that could have been presented at the state trial pursuant to an appropri-
ate procedural mechanism. Yet, as Justice Brennan's opinion in Reed v.
Ross acknowledges, application of this argument to any default occurring
without client consultation "would not only offend generally accepted
principles of comity, but would also undermine the accuracy and effi-
ciency of the state judicial systems to the detriment of all concerned. 398
391. Id. at 155.
392. Id. at 157.
393. See supra Pt. I.B.3.
394. It has been persuasively argued that the majority of trial defaults may be the
result of neglect. See Tague II, supra note 145, at 46.
395. See supra Pt. I.B.3.c.
396. In Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), for example, counsel's misinterpreta-
tion of the law led to his failure to present defendant's claim in a timely manner. The
Supreme Court concluded that this was deliberate bypass rather than a species of inad-
vertence and held the default to be binding. See id. at 46-47. See also supra Pt. I.B.3.c.
The discussion in this Article presumes that as in most cases involving counsel's trial
conduct, the default occurred without consultation with the client. In the converse situa-
tion-when defendant actually instructed counsel to present the claim and the instruction
was ignored--defendant should not be bound. See Appellate Forfeitures, supra note 14, at
881.
397. See supra Pt. I.B.3.c.
398. 104 S. Ct. at 2909.
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The cause definition suggested in this Article, while avoiding an auto-
matic exemption for inadvertence, recognizes the argument that uncon-
scious omissions offer no benefit to a client to offset the harm flowing
from the default. 39 9 However, this argument loses its force as the degree
of harm demonstrated becomes less substantial and thus less in need of
an offset. The definition therefore specifies that inadvertence will consti-
tute cause only when the applicant's incarceration is unjust.
Such an approach does not conflict with Sykes and its successors. The
Supreme Court has treated cause as an inquiry into the factors motivat-
ing counsel and prejudice as an inquiry into the harm stemming from the
constitutional violation, requiring that both prongs be met."° The defi-
nition of cause proposed above remains within these parameters, but con-
ditions the granting of relief for inadvertence on the nature of the
prejudice demonstration. 4" Such a condition would not attach if either
of the alternate branches of the cause definition were invoked.
Our prior prejudice illustration involved a defendant whose confession
bore the earmarks of truth but was elicited without warnings about his
right to remain silent." 2 If the prosecution's case were otherwise cir-
cumstantial, the prejudice requirement would be met. However, the
cause showing would probably fail. Miranda"3 is hardly novel. Presum-
ably, reasonable inquiry would have elicited the fact that the mandated
warnings were not given. No punitive consequences attach to making an
objection to admission of the confession. A deliberate decision to with-
hold objection would not constitute cause, and an inadvertent one would
not qualify because the underlying claim neither indicates innocence nor
involves a defect in the truth-finding procedure. Thus, the justice of de-
fendant's incarceration is not implicated.
C. The Relation of the Cause and Prejudice Standard to Preventing
Miscarriage of Justice
Concern with prevention of a miscarriage of justice has been cited in
several of the Supreme Court's cause and prejudice decisions." 4 This
concern could be seen as embodied in the Sykes standard or as requiring
a separate structure of its own. That is, it could be regarded as satisfied
399. See supra Pt. I.B.3.c.
400. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2908 (1984); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 167-69 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-29 (1982).
401. Sykes evolved from the "cause" requirement established by Congress in Fed. R.
Crim. P. 12. See Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 242 (1973). The Rule 12 cases,
however, appear to merge the cause and prejudice inquiry, examining the relationship of
the default, the merits and the consequences of the omitted objection. See, e.g., Wells v.
Wainwright, 488 F.2d 522, 523 (5th Cir. 1973). The cause definition proposed in this
Article would require two separate inquiries, see Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87; Frady, 456 U.S. at
167-68, but would match the two at the point where a determination is made.
402. See supra notes 306, 308 and accompanying text.
403. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
404. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 163, 172; Isaac, 456 U.S. at 135; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91.
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by the cause and prejudice exception to a general rule that counsel's trial
defaults are binding on a habeas applicant,405 or as an exception to the
Sykes rule itself. Commentators favoring the latter approach" 6 have
viewed avoidance of a miscarriage of justice as a loophole or escape
hatch; this would imply a conflict with the cause and prejudice
requirement.
A close reading of the Supreme Court's procedural default decisions
finds little support for this "loophole" interpretation. Frady's reference
to the subject may be equivocal;" 7 the discussions in Sykes and Isaac,
however, are not. The majority's decision in Sykes states:
The 'cause'-and-'prejudice' exception . . . will afford an adequate
guarantee, we think, that the [Francis] rule will not prevent a federal
habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the federal constitu-
tional claim of a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication
will be the victim of a miscarriage of justice.'' 8
In Isaac, Justice O'Connor expressed confidence that such defendants
"will meet the cause and prejudice standard."'
Accordingly, the definition suggested in this Article must be examined
further to see how it would operate in cases where it would be generally
conceded that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.410 Two hypothetical
examples will be considered: first, a prosecution involving a factually in-
nocent defendant, and second, an instance in which the state engaged in
the egregious misconduct of physically coercing a confession.
Presume that defendant Granite is in fact innocent of a homicide for
which he was convicted, but that improperly adduced identification evi-
dence was introduced against him. Failure to attack such evidence de-
prives him of a significant defense. Prejudice under our definition could
be demonstrated, as there would be a substantial possibility that the con-
stitutional violation changed the verdict.
The cause requirement may be met in several ways. If counsel knew of
405. Kinnamon, Defenses to the Preclusive Rule of Wainwright v. Sykes, 28 Drake L
Rev. 571, 571 (1979).
406. See W. Easton, II Annual Survey of American Criminal Procedure 117, 125
(1983); Goodman & Sallett, supra note 277, at 1711; Defaulted Constitutional Claims,
supra note 113, at 992.
407. The Frady majority noted that the evidence in the record "disposes of [defend-
ant's] contention that he suffered such actual prejudice that reversal of his conviction 19
years later could be justified. [The Court] perceive[s] no risk of a fundamental miscar-
riage of justice in this case." 456 U.S. at 172 (emphasis added). The Court's holding can
be read either as a reference to a category separate from the prejudice requirement or as
an interpretation of that requirement.
408. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91.
409. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 135. The reference in Isaac is to a "fundamental miscarriage of
justice." Id (emphasis added). This may resemble Justice Stevens' reference to funda-
mental fairness in his concurring Sykes opinion. See 433 U.S. at 94-97. However, neither
term is given explicit content outside of the cause and prejudice requirement itself.




this violation but deliberately failed to object even though the faulty iden-
tification was the prime evidence against an innocent defendant, a viola-
tion of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of an attorney
has occurred and the cause standard is satisfied.411 Such a deliberate
forfeiture could only be justified in the rare instance in which an objec-
tion would itself turn the trier of fact against the defendant. 41 2 Under
these extraordinary circumstances, cause could also be found under our
definition because counsel would be faced with two "grisly" alternatives.
It may be more likely, however, that counsel's failure to object resulted
from a faulty pre-trial investigation. Such inadvertence will constitute
cause if the prejudice to the defendant involves the basic justice of his
incarceration-precisely the situation here.
How does the test apply if Marble, a homicide defendant, has been
physically coerced into making a confession? The cause analysis under
these facts would be the same as in Granite's case if the trial attorney
intentionally failed to raise Marble's claim. Unless an unusual demon-
stration of intolerable alternatives could be made, deliberate forfeiture of
an opportunity to object to the admission of the confession would gener-
ally be tantamount to denial of effective assistance of counsel. A prima
facie showing of such a denial was found where trial counsel was told
that defendant had been refused access to an attorney and that he had
been threatened by the police in order to induce his confession. 41 3 No
effort was made to pursue these claims, nor to obtain a copy of the initial
recorded interrogation of the defendant which contained material valua-
ble to the defense but was later destroyed.41 4
A competent lawyer would not "forget" that his client had been com-
pelled to confess, nor fail to ask about the circumstances under which the
confession was elicited. 4 5 Accordingly, an inadvertent forfeiture would
not arise unless defendant Marble was afraid to reveal the facts, and
bruises were not evident. Cause for a forfeiture could therefore be satis-
411. See, e.g., Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 691 (6th Cir. 1974) (ineffective-
ness found where counsel never called to stand a favorable rebuttal witness whose testi-
mony would have refuted palm print identification that was sole evidence against the
defendant); Saltys v. Adams, 465 F.2d 1023, 1028 (2d Cir. 1972) (counsel was incompe-
tent because the only evidence, against defendant was questionable identification testi-
mony and counsel failed to take the rudimentary step of seeking a suppression hearing for
exploration of this evidence). Incompetence would constitute cause under Sykes. See L.
Yackle, supra note 137, § 86, at 347; Tague II, supra note 145, at 25; cf Strazzella, supra
note 198, at 478-79 (ineffective assistance of counsel will qualify as cause under Sykes
only when a federal court determines that the claim need not have been made in state
court and is thus properly before the federal court). See supra note 262.
Note, however, that if the state shows that counsel's incompetence was harmless error,
the writ would not issue. See Tague I, supra note 113, at 143 & n.186.
412. See Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496, 505-07 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
931 (1964).
413. See Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 38 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
978 (1963).
414. Id. at 38-39.
415. Id. at 34-35.
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fled either by a showing that Marble had ineffective assistance of coun-
sel4 16 or by a showing that facts concerning the coercion were reasonably
unavailable.417
A confession is a powerful jury persuader; the required prejudice dem-
onstration4 18 of a substantial possibility that failure to object tipped the
scales may be more easily met in this context than with respect to any
other type of claim. Indeed, if a defendant's confession has been physi-
cally coerced by the state, the Supreme Court has uniformly held that
regardless of the strength of the untainted remainder of the record, the
conviction must be nullified as incompatible with the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause.4"
416. Professor Tague notes that the Sykes cause and prejudice test may result in more
attacks on attorney competence. Among the negative consequences of such attacks may
be that some lawyers will refuse court appointment in criminal cases or feel compelled to
proffer even frivolous objections at trial to avoid defaults and accusations of ineffective-
ness. Still others may view the client as a potential adversary. Tague II, supra note 145,
at 66. Professor Strazzella also argues that the Sykes standard may result in an increase
in unfounded incompetence claims. Strazzella, supra note 198, at 483-84. Goodman and
SaUett conclude that lawyers attempting to protect their professional reputations may
testify that their decisions were tactical when in fact they were nonstrategic. See Good-
man & Sallett, supra note 277, at 1725.
However, a finding of ineffectiveness may not necessarily stigmatize counsel. The Sixth
Circuit in Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965), emphasized that its incom-
petence finding was not meant to be a reflection on the professional reputation of the two
court-appointed attorneys, "both of whom are shown by the record to be reputable and
experienced lawyers. We recognize that good lawyers can and do make mistakes." Id. at
673. Conversely, the possibility of public embarrassment may prod attorneys into raising
their level of performance. See Tague II, supra note 145, at 66. Professor Strazzella
notes further that in cases of blatant incompetence, it is fitting that "the system's failure
be laid directly to the real cause where it can be confronted more clearly." Strazzella,
supra note 198, at 484. Some defaults may stem from the fact that court-appointed attor-
neys are often overburdened and underpaid. See Defaulted Constitutional Claims, supra
note 113, at 996. If defendants are receiving inferior representation at the trial level,
ineffectiveness claims could place added pressure on the states to remedy this deficiency.
Strazzella, supra note 198, at 483-84.
Professor Tague suggests that a court-provided checklist consonant with American Bar
Association guidelines might provide a partial remedy to the problem of incompetence.
The list would include general questions as to whether potential lines of investigation or
objections had been pursued. Counsel's answers could be reviewed by the habeas court if
there were an assertion of ineffectiveness. Tague I, supra note 113, at 164. This proce-
dure would also serve to protect attorneys from unscrupulous clients seeking to attack
their convictions by making charges of incompetence. Furthermore, it should be noted
that although disgruntled clients may be quick to allege a sixth amendment violation,
judges are equally quick to strike down nonmeritorious claims. See United States v.
Joyce, 542 F.2d 158, 160 (2d Cir. 1976) ("'A convicted defendant is a dissatisfied client,
and the very fact of his conviction will seem to him proof positive of his counsel's incom-
petence.' ") (quoting United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795, 797 (2d Cir. 1963)), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977).
417. See supra notes 375-83 and accompanying text.
418. Where defendant has a viable sixth amendment ineffectiveness claim, his preju-
dice burden would be lighter than in Sykes cases. Compare the test in Strickland v.
Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), discussed supra at Pt. I.C., with the prejudice
definition suggested in this Article supra at Pt. II.A.
419. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
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The Court has reasoned that such coercion violates rights "so basic to
a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.
420
A further concern is that the "confession combines the persuasiveness of
apparent conclusiveness with what judicial experience shows to be illu-
sory and deceptive evidence. '4 21  Consequently, once the violation is
proven on a merits review, the habeas applicant's request for relief is
granted.4 zz
This prejudice rule as to coerced confessions has developed in the con-
text of statements admitted at trial over objection.423 Nevertheless, the
conclusion that violations of this magnitude undermine the basic fairness
of a criminal prosecution 424 and the reliability of the conviction also sup-
ports an expeditious determination of prejudice in the Sykes context.
Thus, the definition of cause and prejudice proposed in this Article
would meet the Court's concern with preventing a miscarriage of justice,
without addition of a third prong to the original two. To the extent that
the Court's reference to miscarriage of justice encompasses "essential
rights of the people or of the defendant, '425 the definition takes into ac-
count both considerations.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's current position is that the writ of habeas corpus
199, 206 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958). This position stems in part from "outrage" and a concomitant
desire to deter future "third degree" tactics and prevent the state from profiting by such a
confession. For example, Judge Friendly refers to the outrage which arises in response to
"the confession extorted by the rack." Friendly, supra note 218, at 157. But see White,
Federal Habeas Corpus: The Impact of the Failure to Assert a Constitutional Claim at
Trial, 58 Va. L. Rev. 67, 84-85, 89 (1972) (arguing that habeas corpus should not issue if
the failure to object at trial to a coerced confession was the result of strategy which would
benefit the defendant); see also Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights In Criminal
Cases, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1050, 1061 (1978) (may be good strategy to refrain from ob-
jecting to admission of a coerced confession that has some damaging features but sup-
ports "a significant theory of the defense") [hereinafter cited as Hill II].
420. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
421. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953).
422. See supra text accompanying notes 419-20.
423. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
424. See Enforcement of the Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial. Hearing on S.
895 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 93-121 (1971) (Justice Rehnquist as an Assistant Attorney General testi-
fying that habeas relief is appropriate in cases of gross unfairness such as those involving
coerced confessions); see also Hill II, supra note 419, at 1075 (every Supreme Court Jus-
tice would have misgivings about incarcerating an undoubtedly guilty person whose con-
viction was based upon a confession "induced by physical torture of the prisoner or of
immediate members of the prisoner's family"); Tague II, supra note 145, at 31 n.147
(reference to Justice Rehnquist's testimony, suggesting habeas corpus relief as to convic-
tions resulting from grossly unfair trials).
425. People v. Weatherford, 27 Cal. 2d 401, 420, 164 P.2d 753, 763 (1945); see People
v. Musumeci, 133 Cal. App. 2d 354, 365, 284 P.2d 168, 175 (1955); People v. Robarge,
I I I Cal. App. 2d 87, 95, 244 P.2d 407, 412 (1952); People v. Geibel, 93 Cal. App. 2d 147,
180, 208 P.2d 743, 762-63 (1949).
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will not be generally available to state prisoners proffering a defaulted
constitutional claim. A showing that petitioner's trial counsel unilater-
ally failed to press the claim and had no "deliberate bypass" motivation
is an insufficient basis for granting federal district court review on the
merits.
This Article accepts these parameters and suggests a definition that
could guide habeas courts in determining whether an applicant for relief
has shown cause for his default and prejudice resulting from the constitu-
tional violation alleged. The "actual prejudice" prong, which is based on
a legal rather than on a factual guilt model, requires the applicant to
demonstrate a substantial possibility that but for the violation, his trial
would have culminated in an acquittal. A substantial possibility is one
which clearly could have changed the outcome, but did not necessarily
have this effect. The prejudice showing would be adequate if the federal
district court judge would seriously consider the likelihood of such an
outcome-determinative effect, even if he ultimately concludes that de-
fendant would have been convicted regardless of the error.
Cause would not automatically be found if the petitioner's counsel in-
advertently forfeited the claim, nor automatically be denied if the forfei-
ture was deliberate. Inadvertence suffices only where the petitioner's
prejudice showing indicates factual innocence or a defect in the truth-
finding process. Intentional waiver suffices only where assertion of a
right would result in consequences that are so punitive that a prudent
attorney would feel compelled to avoid them.
Novelty constitutes cause if a retroactive interpretation of the Consti-
tution was too inchoate at the time of trial for a reasonable lawyer to
have anticipated it. The cause requirement is also met if trial counsel
was unaware of the factual basis for a constitutional challenge because
the pertinent information could not have been uncovered by reasonable
inquiry or because a reasonable decision not to investigate was made.
This definition would be appropriate even if the Supreme Court were
to issue rulings further restricting the substantive scope of the writ by
extending the Stone v. Powell rationale.426 Under Stone, the writ may not
be granted to a petitioner who had the opportunity for a full and fair
hearing in the state courts on his fourth amendment claim of an unlawful
search and seizure.427 Extension of the decision to other non-guilt-re-
lated challenges, such as the failure to give Miranda warnings, would
have no impact on the proposed definition. Generally, the two run on
separate tracks. The substantive restriction would apply when a state
court hearing on the claim has taken place, while the Sykes requirement
applies only when there was no such hearing. However, if the petitioner
forfeited an opportunity to present his claim to the state courts, no fed-
eral relief could be accorded on the Miranda violation unless the cause
426. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
427. 428 U.S. at 485-86.
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and prejudice standard is satisfied. The rule would be the same regard-
less of whether Miranda is altered by application of the Stone rationale.
The approach suggested in this Article recognizes not only the value of
maintaining an efficient and accurate state criminal court system, but
also the obligation to prevent unjust incarceration of defendants. Peti-
tions presenting a colorable claim of innocence, or a showing that the
state may have physically coerced petitioner's confession, would consti-
tute the best candidates for satisfying the cause and prejudice definition.
Such petitions will therefore pass through the pre-screening net and navi-
gate habeas review on the merits under the criteria applicable to cases in
which no default has occurred.
